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The Paradoxes of Secured Lending: Is There a Less Uneasy 




 Probably few legal devices are as confusing to an efficiency-oriented lawyer as 
security interests, yet having comparably widespread1 and frequent2 uses in our 
commercial life.  In early 1980s, Professor Schwartz introduced the “puzzle of 
secured debt”, and secured lending was portrayed as a zero-sum game, probably even 
with some net costs.3  Since then, plenty of attempts have been made in the legal 
academia to justify the efficiency of secured debts though seemingly with only limited 
progress.4  At the same time, the potential to redistribute wealth from certain groups 
                                                        
1 Virtually every country in the world recognizes at least some security devices, and according to the 
London attorney Phillip R. Wood, about 80 English-based states allow a universal monopolistic 
security over all assets of the debtor, Lynn M. Lopucki & Elizabeth Warren, SECURED CREDIT: A 
SYSTEMS APPROACH 410 (4th ed. 2003) (citing Phillip R. Wood, MAPS OF WORLD FINANCIAL LAW 
24-25 (1997)).  
2 Professor Listokin’s recent study shows that in the U.S. firms not subject to high risk of tort liabilities, 
about one-third of their debts are secured though the ratio appears lower in the so-called “high-tort” 
firms, see Yair Listokin, Is Secured Debt Used to Redistribute Value from Tort Claimants in Bankruptcy? 
An Empirical Analysis, 57 DUKE L.J. 1062-63 (2008).  
3 Allen Schwartz, Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities: A Review of Current Theories, 10 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 1 (1981) [hereinafter Schwartz, Security Interests]; see also Alan Schwartz, The 
Continuing Puzzle of Secured Debt, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1051 (1984) [hereinafter Schwartz, Continuing 
Puzzle].  For the details of the puzzle, see infra note , and accompanying texts. 
4 Important researches done by law scholars on this subject are, among others, Thomas H. Jackson & 
Anthony T. Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities Among Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. (1979); Saul 
Levmore, Monitors and Freeriders in Commercial and Corporate Settings, 92 YALE L.J. (1982); James 
J. White, Efficiency Justifications for Personal Property Security, 37 VAND. L. REV. 473 (1984); F.H. 
Buckley, The Bankruptcy Priority Puzzle, 72 VA. L. REV. 1393 (1986); Robert E. Scott, A Relational 
Theory of Secured Financing, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 901 (1986) [hereinafter Robert Scott, Relational 
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of unsecured creditors has evoked severe doubt about the desirability of the priority 
statuses conferred upon secured creditors in bankruptcy.  The most influential works 
expressing this concern are two articles co-authored by Professors Bebchuk and Fried 
at the eve of an overhaul of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code.5 
 This paper is inspired directly by the Bebchuk and Fried articles, which 
comprehensively questioned the efficiency of the bankruptcy priority awarded to 
secured claims.  It starts by pointing out the following efficiency benefit of such 
priority largely unmentioned in the legal literature, including the Bebchuk and Fried 
articles: the priority of secured debts undermines borrowers’ incentives to pursue 
excessively risky investment projects under certain circumstances.  However, this 
additional benefit also exposes two interrelated paradoxes pertaining to the welfare 
effects of secured claims with bankruptcy priority.  For one thing, while issuance of 
secured senior debts helps constrain over-risky investment incentives in some 
contexts, it nevertheless promotes this kind of incentives in others.  For another, the 
                                                                                                                                                               
Theory]; George G. Triantis, Secured Debt Under Conditions of Imperfect Information, 21 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 225 (1992) [hereinafter Triantis, Secured Debt]; Randal C. Picker, Security Interests, 
Misbehavior, and Common Pools, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 645 (1992); Barry E. Adler, An Equity-Agency 
Solution to the Bankruptcy-Priority Puzzle, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 73 (1993) [hereinafter Adler, 
Equity-Agency Solution]; Saul Levmore & Hideki Kanda, Explaining Creditor Priorities, 80 VA. L. REV. 
2103 (1994); David Gray Carlson, On the Efficiency of Secured Lending, 80 VA. L. REV. 2179 (1994); 
Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A Property-Based Theory of Security Interests: Taking 
Debtors’ Choices Seriously, 80 VA. L. REV. 2021 (1994); Ronald J. Mann, Explaining the Pattern of 
Secured Credit, 110 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1997); Steven L. Schwartz, The Easy Case for the Priority of 
Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 47 DUKE L.J. 425 (1997). 
5 Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in 
Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857 (1996) [hereinafter Bebchuk & Fried, Uneasy Case 1] and Lucian Arye 
Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy: 
Further Thoughts and a Reply to Critics, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1279 (1996) [hereinafter Bebchuk & 
Fried, Uneasy Case 2]. 
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advantage of disincentivizing excessive risk-taking behaviors, and probably some 
other efficiency advantages too, rests exactly on the distribution effects of the priority 
enjoyed by secured lenders.  By identifying and elaborating these paradoxes of 
secured lending,6 this paper contributes to the literature in two aspects.  First, it 
underlines the overshadowed function of secured lending in attenuating 
overinvestment incentives, which so far has been left out of the calculus when the 
efficiency of secured debts is assessed by most legal scholars.  In particular, this 
study reminds us of the potential price of aggravated risk-taking behaviors if tort 
claims are entrenched with a superpriority status in bankruptcy,7 an issue barely 
brought up in the literature.  Second, this paper also cautions the proponents of the 
secured credit priority system on the fragility of its presumed efficiency which hinges 
substantially upon its distributional outcomes.  The paradoxes discussed below will 
challenge the efforts to buttress the priority of secured claims by qualifying the scope 
of potential victims of its distributional effects.  My discussion in the following parts 
will show that the smaller the scope of victims, the lower the significance of secured 
lending in boosting efficiency.  Essentially, this paper extends the logic underlying 
“the puzzle of secured debt” to the efficiency analysis of secured lending from a 
broader perspective.  Although it is not aimed specifically at offering new solutions 
to the puzzle, this paper seeks to clarify misunderstandings in previous works 
                                                        
6 To be more precise, these are the paradoxes coming with the priority of secured lending. 
7 For suggestions to grant tort creditors superpriority in bankruptcy, see e.g. Christopher M.E. Painter, 
Tort Creditor Priority in the Secured Creditor System: Asbestos Time, the Worst of Times, 36 STAN. L. 
REV. 1045, 1080-83 (1984); Buckley, supra note 4, at 1406, 1417; David W. Leebron, Limited Liability, 
Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1565, 1646-49 (1991); Lynn M. Lopucki, The 
Unsecured Creditor’s Bargain, 80 VA. L. REV. 1887, 1913-14 (1994).  
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following primarily the framework laid down by Professor Schwartz.8     
 Theoretical studies on secured lending have gathered little attention since the late 
1990s.  Yet this vein of studies may take on new importance in light of the recent 
surge of the second lien loans in the capital.9  Article 9 has evidently exerted 
extensive influence abroad as well.  Many transitional economies in Eastern Europe 
actively took in the American style nonpossessory security interests in movable assets 
as they reformed their collateral regimes. 10   China, in its new Property Law 
promulgated in 2007, officially acknowledged the security interests in current and 
after-acquired equipments and inventories.11  In 2004, Japan amended its law on 
filing of personal property and account receivables,12 apparently to facilitate the 
creation on these assets security interests à la UCC.13  All these movements seem to 
be pressing for continuing inquiries into the welfare outcomes of secured debts. 
                                                        
8 For the details of this framework, see infra note 14 and accompanying texts. 
9 Lenders of second lien loans take a security interest in the same assets as does the first lien lenders, 
both of whom have priority in repayment over unsecured creditors with respect to the collateral, see 
Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Antibankruptcy, 119 YALE L.J. 648, 671-75 (2010).  
10 See Rainer Haselmann, Katharina Pistor & Vikrant Vig, How Law Affects Lending, 23 REV. FIN. 
STUD. 549, 553-60 (2010). 
11 Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong He Guo Wu Quan Fa [Property Law of the People’s Republic of China], 
Article 181. 
12 Dohsan Oyobi Saiken No Johto No Taikoh Yohken Ni Kansuru Minpoh No Tokureh Toh Ni 
Kansuru Hohritsu [Act on Special Provisions, etc. of the Civil Code Concerning the Perfection 
Requirements for the Assignment of Movables and Claims] 
13 “… it has drawn great attention in recent years to create security interests in or securitize movables 
and claims for financing purposes … Therefore, this amendment enables the public notice of the 
assignment of the movables and account receivables held by legal persons through filing, so as to 
facilitate the financing by enterprises using movables and claims”, Chieko Nohno, Saiken Johto No 
Taikoh Yohken Ni Kansuru Minpoh No Tokureh Toh Ni Kansuru Hohritsu No Yichibu Wo Kaisei Suru 
Hohritsu: Tehan Riyu [Reason for the Proposal of Amending the Act on Special Provisions, etc. of the 
Civil Code Concerning the Perfection Requirements for the Assignment of Claims] (at the Committee 
of Judicial Affairs, House of Councillors, the National Diet of Japan, Nov. 2nd, 2004). 
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 Below, Part II of this paper outlines the challenges to the efficiency of secured 
lending, especially when some creditors do not make adjustment in interest rates.  
Part III reviews the theories on the efficiency of secured lending, and analyzes 
whether any of them lends support to a less uneasy case for the priority of secured 
claims in bankruptcy.  Part IV fleshes out the two paradoxes of secured lending in 
terms of its effects on borrowers’ overinvesting incentives.  Part V considers some 
additional costs that need to be balanced against the efficiency benefits of secured 
lending.  Part VI extends the paradoxical nature of secured lending to another two 
aspects of its efficiency effects, remedying underinvestment and saving in screening 
costs.  Finally, Part VII concludes. 
 
II. Nonadjusting Creditors and the Distributional Effect of Security Interests 
A. Distributional Effect of Secured Debt  
By obtaining a priority over unsecured creditors when the debtor becomes 
insolvent and unable to pay off all his debts, secured creditors can extract more from 
the bankruptcy estate than a pro rata rule would otherwise have allowed.  Thus, 
secured creditors are less vulnerable to the risk of the debtor’s failure, and will charge 
lower interest rates accordingly.  However, that more assets go to secured creditors 
simply means fewer left for unsecured creditors in case of the debtor’s bankruptcy.  
In other words, to the extent that secured creditors are more risk-resistant, unsecured 
creditors become more vulnerable.  Therefore, if unsecured creditors can properly 
calculate the additional risk due to the existence of outstanding security interests, they 
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will demand higher interests to compensate for it.  As a whole, any decrease in 
interest rates applicable to secured debts will likely be cancelled out by the 
corresponding increase in interest charges applicable to unsecured debts, hence the 
total amount of interest the debtor has to pay stays constant.  Since issuing secured 
debts is costly itself, the now well-known “puzzle of secured debt” stands in the way 
of any serious effort to advocate the efficiency of secured lending.14 
 However, the puzzle exists because of informed and adjusting unsecured creditors.  
If these creditors do not adjust interest rates to reflect the incremented risk, debtors 
can well enjoy the benefit of secured lending from reduced interest rates at the 
expense of unsecured creditors.  Then, essentially, secured debt redistributes wealth 
from nonadjusting general creditors to the debtor.  This kind of distributional effect 
has long been taken note of, and used to explain the prevalence of secured lending in 
spite of certain potential empirical difficulties.15 
 
B. Presence of Nonadjusting Creditors 
                                                        
14 Professor Schwartz listed four assumptions leading to this puzzle: Creditors (i) can learn of and react 
to the existence of security; (ii) can calculate risks of default reasonably precisely; (iii) are risk-neutral; 
and (iv) have homogeneous expectations respecting default probabilities (Schwartz, Security Interests, 
supra note 3, at 7).  Focused on the situation with nonadjusting creditors, this article will not discuss 
the assumptions about risk-neutrality and homogeneous expectation.  For critiques on the efforts to 
resolve the puzzle by relaxing these two assumptions, see Schwartz, Security Interests, supra note 3, at 
22-24, 27-28; Schwartz, Continuing Puzzle, supra note 3, at 1062-66; see also Triantis, Secured Debt, 
supra note 4, at 227-28. 
15 See James H. Scott, Bankruptcy, Secured Debt, and Optimal Capital Structure, 32 J. FIN. 1 (1977) 
[hereinafter James Scott, Bankruptcy]; James H. Scott, Bankruptcy, Secured Debt, and Optimal Capital 
Structure: Reply, 34 J. FIN. 253 (1979) [hereinafter James Scott, Reply]; Schwartz, Security Interests, 
supra note 3, at 30-33 (suggesting that such a distributional explanation predicts incorrectly the 
absence of security in cases when most of the creditors are aware of the security). 
7 
 
Uninformed and nonadjusting creditors seem to exist indeed, hence the 
distributional effect of secured lending not a mere imagination.  If the issuance of 
secured debts is mostly motivated by such a distributional effect, then the priority 
awarded to secured claims should be reconsidered since the negative externality 
suffered by nonadjusting creditors may function to encourage the debtor to undertake 
value-wasting investment projects.  In fact, this is the main argument against the 
priority of secured claims in bankruptcy raised by Professors Bebchuk and Fried.16  
In particular, they pinned down four categories of nonadjusting creditors: (i) private 
involuntary creditors, or tort creditors; (ii) government as holder of tax and regulatory 
claims; (iii) voluntary creditors with small claims such as customers, employees, and 
trade creditors; and (iv) prior voluntary creditors extending credit on fixed terms.17  
For involuntary creditors, nonadjustment may be a combined result of passive 
ignorance and inability to adjust, while for voluntary creditors with small claims, 
especially trade creditors, failure to adjust interest rates in each and every transaction 
is more likely a rational choice given the small amount of claims relative to the cost of 
adjusting.   
 Nonadjusting creditors, however, are not necessarily hurt by the borrower’s 
inefficient investment decisions.  Trade creditors, for example, can charge an interest 
rate that, on average, fully compensates their risk of loss due to security interests even 
                                                        
16 Bebchuk & Fried, Uneasy Case 1, supra note 5; see also Bebchuk & Fried, Uneasy Case 2, supra 
note 5. 
17 Bebchuk & Fried, Uneasy Case 1, supra note 5, at 882-91.  The presence of nonadjusting creditors, 
and tort creditors in particular, is widely noted in the literature.  E.g. James Scott, Bankruptcy, supra 
note 15; Buckley, supra note 4; Leebron, supra note 7; Lopucki, supra note 7; John Hudson, The Case 
Against Secured Lending, 15 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 47 (1995).  
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if they do not adjust their interest rates in any specific transaction.18  Prior voluntary 
creditors, when properly anticipating the risk caused by subsequent secured debts, 
will set the interest rate of their loans to take this risk into account.  To say it in 
another way, the prior voluntary creditors can protect themselves through ex ante 
adjustments, and in those cases rational borrowers would issue secured debts as 
anticipated.19  But there are also nonadjusting creditors who will be hurt by the use 
of security credits with priority.  Tort creditors are obviously among the victims, so 
are the voluntary nonadjusting creditors that do not always deal with the debtor on 
terms reflecting the risk of security interests and that cannot mitigate the risk by 
diversification such as the debtor’s employees and customers.20 
 Those creditors unhurt by secured debts are essentially not subject to the 
distributional effects even if they do not adjust their interest rates per se.  Although 
their existence may help explain the use of secured debts, it should not change the 
efficiency implications of secured lending.  As this paper is concerned mainly about 
the social efficiency, I define nonadjusting creditors in a narrower way as creditors 
                                                        
18 Bebchuk & Fried, Uneasy Case 1, supra note 5, at 886-87; Bebchuk & Fried, Uneasy Case 2, supra 
note 5, at 1313. 
19 Otherwise, prior voluntary creditors will receive a windfall gain.  Bebchuk and Fried admit that the 
prior voluntary creditors can make ex ante adjustments, but they emphasize that this will not stop the 
usage of security interests to “make the borrower better off by allowing it to ‘sell’ to the creditor 
bankruptcy value that would otherwise be enjoyed by these prior nonadjusting creditors”.  Bebchuk & 
Fried, Uneasy Case 1, supra note 5, at 890-91.  In this context, the borrower is better off by issuing 
security debts, but only because it precludes the windfall gain that “would otherwise be enjoyed by” the 
prior voluntary creditors adjusting the interest rate in advance.  The prior voluntary creditors will not 
be exploited insofar as they appropriately anticipate the possibility of subsequent secured debts and set 
the interest rates accordingly, see James Scott, Reply, supra note 15, at 258. 
20 Bebchuk & Fried, Uneasy Case 2, supra note 5, at 1313-14.  Cf. Buckley, supra note 4, at 1407-09 
(arguing that employees and customers are not likely to be hurt substantially). 
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who, when unsecured, cannot increase interest charges to completely account for the 
extra risk caused by the attainment of security interests by other creditors.  In short, 
they are the real victims of the distributional effects created by secured lending.  In 
contrast, an adjusting creditor is able to make such an interest increase.  Adjusting 
creditors, however, are not perfectly informed, either.  Professor Triantis 
distinguishes two types of information imperfections faced by lenders: “(a) 
information asymmetry related to parameters of payoff distributions as they exist at 
the time the debt is issued, and (b) the lenders’ imperfect control over and information 
about decisions of the firm made between the time the debt is issued and its maturity, 
which may change the value of these parameters”.21  The adjusting creditors in this 
paper, unless stated otherwise, are assumed to have accurate information about the 
payoff distributions as they exist at the time of debt issuance, but they have imperfect 
control over and imperfect information about the borrower’s decision between the 
time of debt issuance and maturity. 
 
C. Inefficiencies Resulting from the Distributional Effect  
 As Professor Carlson correctly pointed out,22  the presence of nonadjusting 
creditors suffering a loss due to the use of secured debts with priority alone is not 
sufficient to challenge the efficiency of secured lending, at least in the Kaldo-Hicks 
sense, because the gain accrue to the borrower may well offset or even exceed the loss.  
                                                        
21 Triantis, Secured Debt, supra note 4, at 233. 
22 David Gray Carlson, Secured Lending as a Zero-Sum Game, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 1635, 1665 (1998) 
(“To the extent that economic discourse concerns itself with the maximization of wealth, it does not 
concern itself with wealth transfer per se.”) 
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The comparison between the magnitudes of such gains and losses, however, is 
inevitably an empirical task, and no decisive conclusion can be expected from 
theoretical arguments.  This being said, before meaningful empirical undertakings 
become possible, theoretical analyses are nonetheless worthwhile in terms of 
indentifying the possible origins of costs and benefits.  Hence, I will first summarize 
the major efficiency costs raised by opponents to the priority of security interests in 
this section, and evaluate the theories on the efficiency benefits of this priority scheme 
in the next Part. 
1. Costs of Granting Security Interests as a Net Welfare Loss  
Sometimes the borrower will not change its investment decision no matter 
whether a secured or unsecured loan is used.23  In these situations, the borrower will 
nonetheless choose secured lending purely to take advantage of the lower interest rate 
offered by a secured creditor.  This security interest clearly does not benefit the 
society by any measure as neither the probability of investment failure nor the 
borrower’s asset value in case of investment failure would differ were the lending 
unsecured.  However, the use of security interests itself is never free, and the 
resulting costs, externalized to nonadjusting creditors, become a net social welfare 
loss.24  Professors Bebchuk and Fried identified three primary categories of such 
costs: “(1) ‘contracting costs’ – including the cost of negotiating and perfecting the 
security interest; (2) ‘enforcement costs’ – the costs of policing the collateral; and, 
                                                        
23 See infra Part V Example 5 for an illustration of this situation. 
24 For a numeric illustration of such a case of net welfare loss, see Bebchuk & Fried, Uneasy Case 1, 
supra note 5, at 896-97. 
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perhaps most importantly, (3) ‘opportunity costs’ – the costs created when the security 
interest prevents the borrower from pursing efficient activities.”25 
To this list we may add the increased cost of reorganization when the debtor is 
insolvent.  Because secured creditors have priority, they tend to prefer liquidation, 
which entails lower risk, even if reorganization may generate greater value to all 
parties involved as a whole.26  Secured creditors also tend to push through a speedy 
sale to promptly recover their investments at a price enough to pay off secured credits 
but often less than the assets’ true worth,27 thus resulting in inefficient allocation of 
assets.  Furthermore, secured creditors are more likely to “hold up” the 
reorganization negotiation to extract excess value because they lose little if the failure 
of negotiation leads to liquidation.28 
2. Increased Debtor Misbehaviors 
Debtors misbehave because their interests are not aligned with their creditors’.  
When free from control, they are ready to pursue any activities that make themselves 
better off at the creditors’ expense.  This is the well-known agency problem of debt 
financing.29 
                                                        
25 Bebchuk & Fried, Uneasy Case 2, supra note 5, at 877. 
26 Listokin, supra note 2, at 1037, 1047.  For a general discussion about the bias of secured creditors 
towards liquidation, see Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and the 
Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in 
Bankruptcy, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 97, 106-07 (1984).  However, with the increasingly active role of 
hedge funds in the secured loan market, this long-standing assumption may start to falter, see Douglas 
Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 9, at 668-71 (discussing the different incentives of hedge funds, than 
traditional banks, in case of debtor’s bankruptcy as secured lenders). 
27 Douglas G. Baird, ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY 228 (5th ed. 2010). 
28 Listokin, supra note 2, at 1048. 
29 By talking about the agency problem of debt financing, I assume, as most writers on security 
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The most discussed form of debtor misbehavior in the law and economics 
literature on security interests is “overinvestment”, i.e., the debtor’s preference for 
higher-risk and higher-return projects even though these projects make creditors 
worse off by more than they make the debtor better off.30  This preference stems 
from the fact that the debtor will capture all of the additional return if the risky 
projects succeed while the creditors will bear the costs if they fail.31  Inspired by the 
overinvesting incentive, the debtor may take on a project of a negative net present 
value (NPV) in the absolute sense, or roughly speaking, having an expected value 
lower than its cost.  Alternatively, the undertaken project can also be of a negative 
NPV in a marginal sense, i.e., a project with a lower expected value net of its cost 
given the availability of socially more efficient projects.32  The quintessence of 
overinvestment is the discrepancy between the social and the debtor’s private interests 
                                                                                                                                                               
interests do, that the debtor’s management full-heartedly serve the interest of its shareholders.  In 
other words, the agency problem of equity financing is assumed away.  By and large, the literature in 
secured lending is not concerned with the effects of security interests on equity financing.  Instead, the 
agency cost of equity financing is, maybe implicitly, taken as the precondition for the very existence of 
debt financing.  The only notable exception, to my knowledge, is Professor Adler who believes the 
efficiency of secured lending comes from the value it may add to the debtor’s nonmanagement equity 
investors, see Adler, Equity-Agency Solution, supra note 4.  Professor Levmore also mentioned 
potential positive influence of secured credit on equity holders in an earlier article, see Levmore, supra 
note 4, at 68-71.    
30 I use this term following Bebchuk & Fried, Uneasy Case 1, supra note 5, at 874.  Some law and 
economics scholars use the term “risk-alteration” instead, see e.g. Levmore, supra note 4.  In the 
finance literature, the term “asset substitution” is more often used to refer to roughly the same 
phenomenon.  Strictly speaking, however, asset substitution may be understood as a particular type of 
overinvestment, see Buckley, supra note 4, at 1438. 
31 The overinvestment problem was first explained in Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, 
Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 
(1976); for a formal discussion, see Richard C. Green & Eli Talmor, Asset Substitution and the Agency 
Costs of Debt Financing, 10 JOURNAL OF BANKING AND FINANCE 391 (1986). 
32 Bezalel Gavish & Avner Kalay, On the Asset Substitution Problem, 18 JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL & 
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 21, 27 fn.9 (1983). 
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given the possibility to redistribute wealth from creditors to the debtor.  This 
problem has been widely recognized by law scholars and illustrations abound in legal 
writings.33   
Another form of misbehavior that the debtor may engage in is “asset dilution”, 
which consists of taking assets out of the reach of creditors if the debtor eventually 
goes bankrupt.  Asset dilution can be socially inefficient when it reduces the debtor’s 
value more than the gains it passes on to the debtor’s shareholders.  The debtor’s 
incentive to remove assets originates, again, from the prospect that the creditors will 
bear the costs of such removal when the debtor fails.34 35 
Debtor misbehaviors can be exacerbated in two ways when a secured debt is used 
in the presence of nonadjusting creditors.  First, secured creditors tend to charge 
lower interest rates.  But if unsecured creditors adjust interest rates to offset the 
worsened repayment prospect of their loans, the debtor’s overall cost of borrowing 
remains unchanged, so its incentive to borrow will not vary on the whole.  However, 
since nonadjusting creditors do not make such adjustment after the issuance of a 
secured debt, the total cost of borrowing declines as the debtor borrows on a secured 
basis.  Therefore, compared with a world disallowing secured lending, the debtor 
will be more willing to borrow if secured lending is an option.  Expanded reliance on 
                                                        
33 See e.g. Buckely, supra note 4, at 1426-29; Levmore & Kanda, supra note 4, at 2108-11; Bebchuk & 
Fried, Uneasy Case 1, supra note 5, at 873-74. 
34 For a numerical example of asset dilution, see Bebchuck & Fried, Uneasy Case 1, supra note 5, at 
874-75. 
35 A third form of debtor misbehavior is “underinvestment”.  Its bearing with security interests is also 
explored extensively, though perhaps incompletely, in law and economics works.  The thrust of this 
relationship becomes clearer when we better understand the connection between the priority of security 
interests and the overinvestment problem, see infra Part VI A..   
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debt financing, in turn, intensifies the debtor’s incentive to overinvest.36 
Second, although debtor misbehaviors can be restricted by creditors’ monitoring, 
and cost-effective monitoring reduces the agency costs involved in debt financing, 
secured creditors will have less incentive in monitoring because they are insulated 
from the negative effects of debtor misbehaviors insofar as the value of the collateral 
does not drop below the amount of their loans.37  In a competitive debt market absent 
nonadjusting creditors, reduced monitoring by secured creditors may well implicate 
intensified monitoring efforts by unsecured creditors.  The debtor then will demand 
optimal level of monitoring as it bears the agency costs to the full extent.  Given the 
different incentives in monitoring brought about by secured and unsecured debts, and 
the uneven monitoring capabilities among creditors, the debtor should award security 
interests strategically to encourage optimal monitoring, thus minimizing the agency 
costs it is expected to bear.  Indeed, this idea is squarely embodied in the early 
efforts of identifying the efficiency of secured debts.38 
                                                        
36 See infra Part IV B. for details. 
37  Most commentators agree that security interests disincentivize creditors to monitor debtor 
misbehaviors when their loans are sufficiently secured, see Buckley, supra note 4, at 1440, 1443; 
Triantis, Secured Debt, supra note 4, at 244; Adler, Equity-Agency Solution, supra note 4, at 89; 
Bebchuk & Fried, Uneasy Case 2, supra note 5, at 1317-18.  But Professor Levmore posits that 
secured creditors are nevertheless likely to engage in asset-specific monitoring, see Levmore, supra 
note 4, at 55-59.  For critiques on Levmore’s theory, see Schwartz, Continuing Puzzle, supra note 3, at 
1056-59 (discussing its theoretical inconsistency); Buckley, supra note 4, at 1442-44 (suggesting its 
empirical weakness in addition to the theoretical difficulties). 
38 See Jackson & Kronman, supra note 4, at 1143; see also Triantis, Secured Debt, supra note 4, at 
244-45 (incorporating Levmore’s theory of asset-specific monitoring).  The monitoring efficiency 
argument for secured debts, however, does not bear out empirically, see Schwartz, Security Interests, 
supra note 3, at 11-14; Buckley, supra note 4, at 1441-44.  In this paper, I do not attempt to assess the 
validity of the monitoring cost justification for security interests, as my focus on cases with the 
existence of nonadjusting creditors contradicts the very assumption underlying this justification, 
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When the unsecured creditors do not adjust their monitoring efforts or interest 
rates as a consequence of the debtor’s grant of security interests, however, the 
issuance of secured debts simply decreases the total monitoring efforts by all creditors, 
and the probability of debtor misbehaviors rises as a result.  The reduced monitoring 
can, as Professors Bebchuk and Fried have depicted, take the form of reduced use of 
financial covenants and reduced effort in enforcing the covenants that do appear in 
secured loan agreements.39  An important function of loan covenants is to simplify 
monitoring by creditors in that a breach of covenants may signal potential debtor 
misbehaviors hard to be observed otherwise.  So enforcing these covenants as agreed 
is a primary approach to control the debtor’s opportunistic actions after debt 
issuance.40  Fully secured creditors are insufficiently incentivized to incorporate 
rigorous covenants in their loan agreements, and perhaps more importantly, to 
diligently enforce the ones that do get incorporated since the priority they enjoy 
                                                                                                                                                               
namely, unsecured creditors adjusting interest rates to reflect their increased monitoring costs in the 
wake of the issuance of secured debts. 
39 Professors Bebchuk and Fried seem to agree that reduced use and reduced enforcement of loan 
covenants reflect secured creditors’ dampened enthusiasm to monitor the debtor because they discussed 
these two issues in the same subsection named as “reduced monitoring by secured lenders under full 
priority” in Bebchuk & Fried, Uneasy Case 2, supra note 5, at 1315-18; see also Bebchuk & Fried, 
Uneasy Case 1, supra note 5, at 897-98, 900-902 (less clear about the point that lack of interest in 
using and enforcing covenants exhibit, in essence, secured creditors’ reduced incentive for monitoring 
under full priority). 
40 Some covenants specifically require information, such as financial statements and accounting 
techniques, from the debtor, thus facilitating the detection of misbehaviors.  Others forbid certain 
activities that may link to debtor misbehaviors, such as borrowing new debts or paying dividends, so 
the breach of these covenants warns against potential misbehaviors.  For a detailed analysis of the 
economic functions of financial covenants, see Clifford W. Smith, Jr. & Jerold B. Warner, On Financial 
Contracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenants, 7 J. FIN. ECON. 117 (1979); for an explanation of the 
legal issues involved in drafting and using financial covenants, see Robert M. Lloyd, Financial 
Covenants in Commercial Loan Documentation: Uses and Limitations, 58 TENN. L. REV. 335 (1991). 
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perfectly shields them from the negative effects of the elevated probability of debtor 
misbehaviors. 
3. Lowered Precaution Against Tort Liabilities 
The third category of inefficiency accompanying the distributional effect of 
security interests under the current priority scheme is that the borrower is likely to 
take less precaution against the potential tort liabilities resulting from its operation.  
Though not inherently a form of agency costs of debt financing, insufficient 
precaution against harm to third parties nevertheless represents a loss to the society. 
When the debt is unsecured, the creditor will charge the debtor a higher interest 
rate, to the extent that it anticipates future tort claims will dilute the creditor’s share in 
the borrower’s bankruptcy estate, thus lowering the value of its loan.  Through this 
mechanism, the creditor forces the debtor to internalize more of the costs of potential 
accidents if the latter fails to take enough precaution.  A secured debt with full 
priority, however, safeguards the creditor against the dilution of tort claims, thereby 
eliminating the necessity to raise the interest rate.  Consequently, it is easier for the 
debtor to externalize the costs of potential harm to tort victims, and its incentive to 
take precaution diminishes.41  What follows will be an increase in value of unsafe 
firms, which in turn results in an inefficient allocation of capital to these firms and a 
                                                        
41 Bebchuk & Fried, Uneasy Case 2, supra note 5, at 1319; see also Bebchuk & Fried, Uneasy Case 1, 
supra note 5, at 898-900.  For the more general issue of suboptimal investment in precaution as a 
result of limited liability of which the problem discussed here is a part, see Henry Hansmann & Reinier 




greater number of accidents.42 
With all these inefficiencies, the priority status held by secured creditors in 
bankruptcy indeed becomes an uneasy award unless there are enough counteracting 
benefits, and the rest of this paper is to explore these benefits. 
 
III. A Review of the Theories on the Efficiency of Secured Lending 
 Explorations for its efficiency benefits have long been at the center of the 
scholarly research on security lending.   However, since the uneasy case presented 
by Professors Bebchuk and Fried targets specifically at the priority of secured claims 
with nonadjusting creditors on the scene, to make the case less so, such benefits must 
(i) stem from the priority effect, and (ii) exist even in the presence of nonadjusting 
creditors.  As discussed below, most efficiency arguments for secured lending are 
either misleading or not meeting these two criteria.43 
A. Signaling Efficiency 
Arguments for the efficiency of secured lending can be divided roughly into two 
groups – those based on its function of mitigating information asymmetry and those 
underscoring its role in tackling with agency problems.44  While the focus of this 
                                                        
42 Buckley, supra note 4, at 1417-18. 
43 This Part does not address the efficiency of secured lending in overcoming underinvestment as this 
seems to be the consensus even Professors Bubchuk and Fried did not dispute.  To alleviate the 
uneasiness of the priority enjoyed by secured creditors, therefore, requires the identification of some 
other benefits.  But the underinvestment problems will be discussed later in this paper which argues 
that even this merit of secured lending is actually subject to the “paradox of security lending”, see Part 
VI A. infra. 
44 To be more accurate, the former group focuses on the “information asymmetry related to parameters 
of payoff distributions as they exist at the time the debt is issued”, while the latter on the difficulty in 
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paper, as well as of Professor Bebchuk and Fried’s, is on the latter,45 I will briefly 
assess the signaling efficiency justification presented by the former group.46 
The signaling efficiency theory assumes that the lenders have imperfect 
information about the risk of the debtor’s projects, but are aware of the possibility that 
firms with low-quality projects will borrow at interest rates not reflecting the risk of 
these projects if the interest rates are set based on relatively high-quality projects.  
So lenders will, when lacking information about the quality of particular projects, 
suppose the average project quality to be low and charge higher interest rates 
accordingly.  Then the firms with projects of higher quality than the market average, 
hoping for better interest rates, will have an incentive to signal to the market their 
relative status.47 
A security interest serves as a credible signal if the borrower’s cost of awarding it 
varies inversely with the quality of its investment, making firms with low quality 
projects less inclined to send the same signal.  The proponents of this theory submit 
that it is indeed the case.48  Four attributes of secured debts are thought to be relevant 
in this respect.  First, a security interest in a specific asset reduces the future 
                                                                                                                                                               
controlling debtor misbehaviors after the debt is issued but before its maturity, see supra note 21 and 
the accompanying texts. 
45 The limited empirical study on the efficiency of secured lending finds little support for the 
information-asymmetry theory, see Michael J. Barclay & Clifford W. Smith, Jr., The Priority Structure 
of Corporate Liabilities, 50 J. FIN. 899 (1995). 
46  Professor Buckley proposed another theory regarding information asymmetry, the screening 
efficiency of secured debts, see Buckley, supra note 4, at 1421-26.  Interesting as it is, the specific 
mechanism underlying the screening efficiency is not necessarily clear.  See Part VI B. infra for a 
short discussion. 
47 Schwartz, Security Interests, supra note 3, at 14-15. 
48 The description in the following paragraphs is based on Triantis, Secured Debt, supra note 4, at 247, 
253-55; see also Schwartz, Security Interests, supra note 3, at 15. 
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alienability of the asset by the debtor because, as a general rule, the transfer of 
collateral passes title to the transferee subject to the perfected security interest unless 
the transfer is made in the ordinary course of business.  As a result, the debtor, after 
issuance of secured debts, constrains its ability to capitalize on riskier investment 
opportunities by substituting the collateral.  All else being equal, this constraint is 
more costly for firms with riskier and less profitable investment. 
Second, if the collateral is a piece of firm-specific asset with substantial 
idiosyncratic value to the debtor, loss of such value resulting from the enforcement of 
security interest amounts to a significant threat to the debtor.  The greater the 
probability of default, the larger the expected cost of losing the idiosyncratic value.  
Therefore, low-quality debtors would be less willing to grant security interests in 
firm-specific assets. 
Third, in the event of default, the repossessory right held by secured creditors 
usually enables them to quickly seize the collateral.  Since the equity value of a 
financially distressed firm depends on the probability of recovery which wanes with 
the shortened time span of debt enforcement by secured creditors, the issuance of 
secured debts becomes more expensive for lower-quality borrowers, all else being 
equal. 
Finally, given their ability to seize collateral and thereby impede the debtor’s 
operations, secured creditors can sometimes exert substantial influence on the 
debtor’s business decisions.  The cost of the expected interference, however, is 
believed to vary inversely with firm quality. 
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The signaling theory is criticized by Professor Schwartz for lack of exactness, 
stability, and the possibility of dissipative signaling.49  But even if the arguments 
made by its advocates are sufficiently persuasive, the effectiveness of signaling seems 
to depend on, as Professors Bebchuk and Fried call it, the priority-independent 
benefits of secured debt, so the signaling efficiency theory does not meet the first 
criterion set above.  Professor Adler asserts that a security interest is both a property 
interest and a priority interest.50  To that end, it appears that the presumed signaling 
function of a security interest derives primarily from its characteristics as a property 
interest.  The curtailed alienability is obviously a consequence of the in rem nature 
of property interests.51  The repossessory right is also likely to find its kinship from 
property interests, e.g. the right of eviction traditionally held by landlords.52  To the 
extent that the secured creditor’s leverage comes from this repossessory right, it might 
as well be understood as a byproduct of proprietary effects of security interests.53  As 
                                                        
49 See Schwartz, Security Interests, supra note 3, at 17-21; Alan Schwartz, Taking the Analysis of 
Security Seriously, 80 VA. L. REV. 2073, 2084-85 (1994); see also Alan Schwartz, A Theory of Loan 
Priorities, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 209, 244-47 (1989). 
50 Barry E. Adler, Secured Credit Contracts, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND 
LAW 405 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) [hereinafter Adler, Secured Credit]. 
51 For the in rem nature of property interests, see Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What 
Happened to Property in Law and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 360-66 (2001). 
52 See William B. Stoebuck & Dale A. Whitman, THE LAW OF PROPERTY, § 6.80 (3rd ed. 2000).  
Admittedly, this kind of self-help right substantially diminished even with respect to property interests.  
However, the key point here is that the signaling effect of a security interest, if any, does not reply on 
its priority. 
53  Professor Listokin suggests that the effectiveness of foreclosure as a deterrence to debtor 
misbehaviors depends critically on the priority of security.  But for the priority enjoyed by secured 
creditors in bankruptcy, the foreclosure threat would not be credible when the debtor counterthreatens 
filing of bankruptcy, see Listokin, supra note 2, at 1050 n39.  First of all, Listokin’s reasoning 
apparently assumes that the debtor’s counterthreat is credible, which, given the costs of bankruptcy on 
the debtor, may not be true.  But even if we are ready to accept this assumption, his position is not 
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for the loss of idiosyncratic value, it is clear that priority does not matter, either.  
This kind of loss occurs whenever the collateral is sold, but has nothing to do with 
how the sale proceeds are divided among the creditors. 
 
B. Monitoring Efficiency 
The monitoring efficiency argument, as well as the leverage and the 
                                                                                                                                                               
convincing as the priority of security interests, if it does anything, probably undermines, rather than 
advances, the credibility of the foreclosure threat. 
 It is crucial to note that the credibility of this threat depends on whether the secured creditor’s 
expected payoff when it carries out the threat is greater than its expected payoff when it does not, given, 
respectively, the existence or nonexistence of priority.  Even in a world without priority, the secured 
creditor’s threat is credible as long as it expects to be better-off by carrying out its threat, and the same 
condition holds for the threat to be credible in a world with priority.  It does not matter, however, 
whether the secured creditor would recover more should it enjoy the priority.  Judging by this standard, 
it seems that a secured creditor entitled to priority will, at most, be indifferent as to whether to carry out 
its threat and trigger the bankruptcy filing immediately because in either case it will be fully repaid 
insofar as it is not undersecured.  Indeed, considering the imperfect protections provided to secured 
claims under the bankruptcy law, the secured creditor may even be worse-off by trapping itself into the 
bankruptcy process (For the imperfections of bankruptcy protection of secured claims, see Steven 
Schwartz, supra note 4, at 456-57).  On the other hand, without priority, a secured creditor will still 
proceed to foreclose if the resulting immediate bankruptcy is expected to provide better financial 
recovery than what it would otherwise receive through later debt collection.  Interestingly, when the 
secured creditor, in this context, believes that the debtor attempts to misbehave, perhaps it is bound to 
take action immediately since debtor misbehaviors by definition will reduce the amount of assets 
available to creditors, from which the secured creditor will be repaid proportionately.  The secured 
creditor can hardly expect more value if it tolerates the misbehavior.  Foreclosure thus seems to be a 
dominant strategy for the secured creditor with no priority.  Without the shield of priority, the secured 
creditor is exposed to the danger of debtor’s wealth-redistributing actions just like unsecured creditors.  
Therefore, the secured creditor should be more serious at wielding any power it has to deter the 
debtor’s opportunism in a world where priority does not exist.  This, however, leads us to a more 
fundamental question about why a fully secured creditor entitled to priority will ever want to control 
debtor misbehaviors as far as these misbehaviors do not impair the value of collateral.  If secured 
creditors with priority even “do not in fact appear to do much actual monitoring of collateral value”, 
then it is unrealistic to anticipate them to use whatever leverage they may have to prevent the debtor 
from misbehaving, see Buckley supra note 4, at 1443.  After all, they will be repaid from the 
collateral value regardless of the debtor’s behaviors.  I will further discuss this issue below, in 
connection with the monitoring efficiency and leverage efficiency arguments for security interests, see 
Part III B. & C. infra. 
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overinvestment prevention arguments discussed below, focus on the potential benefits 
of secured lending to lessen the agency costs of debt financing.  Effectively, they all 
stress the advantage of using secured lending to constrain debtor misbehaviors at a 
lower cost. 
The presumed monitoring efficiency of secured debts comes from the differing 
incentives to monitor the borrower of secured vs. unsecured creditors.  One line of 
reasoning, referred to as the “relative skills theory” sometimes,54 starts by noting that 
secured lenders are less incentivized to monitor the debtor since they are free from the 
risk of loss insofar as the value of their collateral exceeds the value of their loan.  On 
the other hand, when advised of the existence of secured credits, unsecured lenders 
will increase their monitoring efforts as they are now subject to even higher risk of 
loss in the event that the debtor misbehaves.  In light of such an incentive difference, 
the borrower will be better off if it issues security interests in a way that reduces the 
overall agency costs in a competitive debt market.  This can be achieved by granting 
security interests to lenders with relatively higher monitoring costs to muffle their 
willingness to monitor, thus channeling the monitoring responsibility to those more 
skilled monitors.55 
Another version of the monitoring theory emphasizes the possibly disparate 
nature of asset-specific monitoring vis-à-vis general monitoring.  It maintains that 
secured creditors are encouraged to conduct asset-specific monitoring of debtor 
                                                        
54 Buckley, supra note 4, at 1141. 




misbehaviors concerning the collateral while unsecured creditors will be led to 
policing other agency problems.  When different creditors have comparative 
advantages in different kinds of monitoring, security interests enable the parties to 
exploit economies of scale and of specialization by efficient allocation of monitoring 
tasks among creditors.56  Therefore, this version of monitoring efficiency argument 
is called the “specialization theory”.57 
The logic underpinning the relative skills theory seems sound.  As the 
lower-cost monitor undertakes more intensive monitoring, saving the efforts of the 
higher-cost monitor, the total monitoring costs decline although the resulting degree 
of monitoring is still not optimal given the externality of monitoring in multiple 
creditor cases.  The critics’ major attack against this theory lies in its failure to be 
borne out empirically.  For instance, banks are more frequently secured than trade 
creditors, notwithstanding the fact that the latter is unlikely to be more sophisticated 
monitors than the former.58  Similarly, suppliers to complex businesses are not 
secured any more frequently than suppliers to simple businesses in spite of the 
relative convenience for the latter to monitor.59  It is worth noticing that secured 
lending might be a rather primitive device for allocating monitoring responsibilities 
among creditors with varying skills in policing debtor misbehaviors.  Indeed, it 
works almost like an on-and-off switch when the secured creditor has enough cushion 
                                                        
56 See Levmore, supra note 4, at 55-57; see also Triantis, Secured Debt, supra note 4, at 244-45.  
57 Buckley, supra note 4, at 1142. 
58 Buckley, supra note 4, at 1141-42. 
59 Schwartz, Security Interests, supra note 3, at 11 n28. 
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of equity from the collateral.60 
The specialization theory, on the other hand, relies on the dubious validity of 
more restrictive assumptions.  One necessary condition for such specialized 
monitoring appears to say that a creditor will be more motivated to monitor some 
particular assets when they are used to secure the creditor’s loan.  But the opposite 
situation may be equally, if not more, possible.  The property nature of security 
interests dulls the creditor’s avidity in monitoring asset substitution or asset removal 
involving the collateral because nonconsensual transfer of collateral usually does not 
threaten the secured creditor’s rights on it, but no similar protection is available to 
unsecured creditors.  In addition, when a creditor does have comparative advantage 
in monitoring certain kind of assets, it should be no less motivated to monitor these 
assets as an unsecured creditor than as a secured one, and its monitoring is likely to be 
part of the equilibrium outcome of a noncooperative game.  As Professor Schwartz 
has acutely noted, only one monitor can exist in a stable equilibrium, no matter 
whether a secured debt is used, when one creditor’s monitoring is sufficient to prevent 
debtor misbehaviors related to particular assets.61  Since there is a creditor assumed 
to be better at such monitoring, the equilibrium that elicits its monitoring is probably 
the focal point of the game.  Therefore, monitoring, if ever occurs, will plausibly be 
conducted by this creditor.  In other words, specialized monitoring is always possible, 
be the debt secured or not. 
                                                        
60 In theory, the parties can leave the secured creditor’s loan only partly secured, and adjust the ratio of 
the secured and unsecured portions to fine-tune the creditors’ monitoring incentive, but in practice, the 
cost of doing so may well outweigh its benefit.  
61 See Schwartz, Continuing Puzzle, supra note 3, at 1055-58. 
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Even if monitoring efficiency, of either kind, does exist when all creditors make 
adjustment as a result of issuance of secured debts, this efficiency will not arise in the 
presence of nonadjusting creditors.  One creditor’s monitoring would lower the 
probability of debtor misbehavior, which is a benefit shared by all creditors of the 
same debtor, but the costs of monitoring is borne solely by the creditor that monitors.  
Because of this free rider problem, creditor monitoring is suboptimal in general.  As 
security dampens the secured creditor’s monitoring incentive further, secured lending 
will exacerbate the under-monitoring problem if unsecured creditors do not strengthen 
their monitoring accordingly.  This implies that, with the presence of nonadjusting 
creditors, secured debts will not improve the overall monitoring efficiency except 
when it is the nonadjusting creditors that are secured, which appears unlikely without 
compulsory legal intervention.62  Therefore, monitoring efficiency cannot pass the 
second criteria mentioned above for a less uneasy case of secured credit. 
 
C. Leverage Efficiency 
A third argument for the efficiency of secured lending looks at the leverage held 
by secured creditors to restrict potential debtor misbehaviors.  According to 
Professor Scott, “the primary value of collateral is … the strong negotiating position 
that it gives to the secured creditor”,63 and “the function of secured credit is 
conceived within the industry as enabling the creditor to influence debtor actions prior 
                                                        
62 Were nonadjusting creditors secured, the distributional effect of security would not be an issue in the 
first place. 
63 Robert Scott, Relational Theory, supra note 4, at 945. 
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to the onset of business failure”.64  This presumed effect of security on curbing 
debtor misbehaviors, however, relies on, at least, two integrated conditions: (i) 
secured lending increases the creditor’s leverage; and (ii) the secured creditor is 
properly motivated to use its leverage. 
Does secured lending increase the creditor’s leverage over the debtor’s discretion 
in investment strategy?  The advocates of the leverage theory believe that “the main 
foundation of the secured creditor’s leverage is the differential between the 
collateral’s value to the borrower and the amount that the lender would credit on the 
loan if the collateral were liquidated under the security agreement or mortgage”.65  In 
other words, the secured creditor’s ability to liquidate the debtor’s assets at a value 
lower than what they are worth to the debtor imposes constraints on the debtor’s 
opportunism that may trigger such liquidation.  But is this ability unique to secured 
creditors?  Are unsecured creditors able and willing to do so as well?66  A creditor 
is inclined to sell assets at a price less than their value to the debtor for two reasons 
when doing so is cost-justifiable.  First, these assets generate value specific to the 
debtor so that no other market participants can enjoy such value.  Second, although 
the assets can be sold at a higher price, doing so does not give the creditor any extra 
benefit surpassing the extra cost.  The first reason seems applicable to secured and 
unsecured creditors alike.  If we suppose the assets are sold at lower prices for the 
second reason, however, secured creditors may have different incentives than 
                                                        
64 Id. at 950. 
65 Mann, supra note 4, at 665. 
66 Professor Buckley suspects that the leverage held by a secured creditor is not substantially different 
from that held by an unsecured creditor, see Buckley supra note 4, at 1145-46. 
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unsecured creditors to pursue this kind of sale.  When the debtor is insolvent,67 an 
adequately secured creditor will not realize any gain by selling the collateral at a 
higher price than what is necessary to recover its loan, while an unsecured creditor 
will benefit, according to its share in the total unsecured bankruptcy claims, from any 
increment in the sale price of the debtor’s assets.68  Therefore, other things being 
equal, a fully secured creditor is more likely to liquidate the debtor’s assets at low 
prices if it does conduct such liquidation at all.  In addition, relying on its right to 
foreclose, a secured creditor can make the liquidation less costly.  In particular, 
Professor Scott emphasizes that the foreclosure right precludes the necessity of 
verifying the debtor’s inefficient investment decision to the court, which can be 
extremely hard.69  All these seem to suggest that a security interest does give a 
creditor some unique leverage over the debtor. 
But the additional leverage possessed by secured creditors does not necessarily 
imply that they will be motivated to use such leverage.  As repeatedly noted above, 
secured creditors become less eager to monitor debtor misbehaviors, which inevitably 
                                                        
67 If the debtor is not insolvent, secured and unsecured creditors should have similar incentives to 
liquidate the debtor’s assets to recover debts because, in this situation, all creditors, whether secured or 
not, are supposed to get fully repaid. 
68 If the collateral is insufficient to pay off a secured creditor’s bankruptcy claims, the creditor will 
have strong incentive to push the price of collateral to recover its loan, and act like an unsecured 
creditor in tackling with the debtor’s other assets. 
69 Robert E. Scott, The Truth about Secured Financing, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1437, 1451 (1997).  It 
should be noted, however, that the secured creditor’s right to repossess and foreclose after default is not 
unlimited.  As the most important limit on this right, self-help repossession will be denied for breach 
of the peace (U.C.C. §9-609), in which case the secured creditor will not be allowed to bypass the 
formal court procedures.  For a detailed discussion of the “breach of the peace” limit, see LoPucki & 
Warren, supra note 1, at 47-52.  Moreover, Professor Buckley suspects that secured creditors do not 
have unequivocal advantage in enforcing their loans as unsecured lenders may also bargain for the right 
to send in a receiver on default, see Buckley, supra note 4, at 1146. 
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means that they are less prone to deter these misbehaviors, whatever leverage they 
may have.  Fully secured creditors can comfortably rely on the cushion of equity, 
and even when inadequately secured, the creditors’ incentive to monitor will shrink to 
the extent they are secured in that additional monitoring will not have as much benefit 
as if they were completely unsecured.70  Professor Scott did record some evidence 
that secured creditors routinely monitor the debtor’s business affairs.71  What needs 
to be proved, however, is that the same creditors would not have engaged in 
monitoring more, or at least equally, diligently were they unsecured.  Otherwise, as 
Professor Buckley rightly noted, any cost savings associated with the additional 
leverage held by secured creditors would probably be offset by the inefficiencies that 
arise when a major lender has a reduced incentive to monitor.72  But for this 
counterfactual, the proponents of the leverage theory have not provided any clue.73 
                                                        
70 Suppose that the amount of a certain lender’s loan is L, of which 1-a% is secured (0 < a < 100), and 
that the amount of the borrower’s other unsecured debt is C.  Then every unit of monitoring will 
increase this lender’s loan recovery by a%L/(a%L+C) of the increase in the debtor’s asset value 
resulting from this last unit of monitoring.  But if the creditor were unsecured, all else being equal, 
every additional unit of monitoring would make it better-off by L/(L+C) of the increase in the debtor’s 
asset value due to such monitoring.  Obviously, extra monitoring can bring the creditor more benefit 
when it is unsecured for L/(L+C) > a%L/(a%L+C).  In other words, marginal benefit of monitoring is 
higher when a creditor is unsecured.  Assuming, quite plausibly, that the creditor’s marginal cost of 
monitoring does not vary with the acquisition of security, we should expect a creditor’s monitoring 
efforts to drop as it is secured. 
71 Robert Scott, Relational Theory, supra note 4, at 947. 
72 Buckley, supra note 4, at 1446. 
73  Professor Mann presented a dramatic example in which the secured creditor significantly 
misunderstood the enforceability of the collateral to underline the necessity for secured creditors to 
monitor, see Mann, supra note 4, at 640 n55.  But such a problem stemming from the nature of the 
debtor’s assets should perplex unsecured creditors as much as secured creditors.  In other words, 
given the special nature of these assets, a creditor might as well be better incentivized to monitor when 
it is unsecured than secured.  Mann suggests another reason why secured lenders would be imprudent 
to rely predominantly on their ability to obtain forcible repayment through liquidation of the collateral 
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In any event, even if we are ready to believe that, without presence of 
nonadjusting creditors, secured lenders will really exert their influence, through 
whatever mechanism, to restrict debtor misbehaviors so that the aggregate amount of 
agency costs goes down, the leverage theory fails to explain why rational secured 
creditors will still be interested in constraining debtor misbehaviors, rather than 
making profits on these misbehaviors, when nonadjusting creditors do appear.74  For 
example, a creditor will happily finance the $500 cost of a project yielding $3,000 
with 10% chance and $0 with 90% chance by taking a security interest on the debtor’s 
$800 safe assets if the debtor, subject to a tort liability of $1,000, agrees to share the 
gains from this inefficient investment with the creditor.  Consequently, the leverage 
theory is unlikely to establish the efficiency of secured lending in the presence of 
nonadjusting creditors. 
 
D. Controlling Overinvestment 
The last important argument for the efficiency of secured lending centers on the 
overinvestment problem.  Three mechanisms have been suggested to control either 
the debtor’s ability or incentive to overinvest.  
1. Disabling Asset Substitution 
                                                                                                                                                               
is that they are generally not able to recover the indirect costs that they incur when monitoring a 
problem loan, see Mann, supra note 4, at 640 n55.  But this fits squarely as a reason for curtailed, 
rather than enhanced, monitoring incentives held by secured creditors. 
74 Given the existence of nonadjusting creditors, expecting a secured creditor to use its leverage and 
control debtor misbehaviors essentially counts on a free riding structure to boost efficiency.  As 
Professor Buckley noted more than two decades ago, the question of “who monitors the monitor” will 
loom up in any arrangement based on free riding, see Buckley, supra note 4, at 1142-43. 
30 
 
As security interests run with the collateral when it is transferred without the 
secured lender’s permission, the pledged assets become less valuable to be substituted 
for more risky assets.  Also, secured creditors’ repossessory right allows for timely 
and less costly action to default.  These features of security interests are considered 
to constrain the borrower’s ability to overinvest through asset substitution.75  But this 
perceived function of secured debt apparently has nothing to do with its priority 
status.76 
2. Precluding Subsequent Borrowing to Finance Risky Projects 
Granting security interests to earlier lenders, it is argued, can limit the debtor’s 
ability to finance subsequent overinvestment based on the belief that the later lender 
will only agree to advance credit at an interest rate so high as to render the risky 
project unattractive to the debtor.77  In other words, the previously issued secured 
debt forces subsequent creditors to take into account the risk of inefficient projects 
and adjust the cost of capital appropriately. 
This efficiency rationale for secured lending, however, seems less convincing if 
the earlier lender is well informed and has full flexibility to adjust its interest rate.  
No matter whether it lends secured at a lower interest rate or unsecured at a higher 
interest rate, the cost of overinvestment will fall always on the debtor given that the 
subsequent lender is also an adjusting creditor.  Therefore, this second mechanism of 
                                                        
75 Clifford W. Smith, Jr. & Jerold B. Warner, Bankruptcy, Secured Debt, and Optimal Capital Structure: 
Comment, 34 J. FIN. 247, 250 (1979). 
76 See supra note 50-53 and the accompanying texts. 
77 Adler, Secured Credit, supra note 50, at 406; see also George G. Triantis, A Free-Cash-Flow Theory 




overinvestment control rests inevitably on the relaxation of one assumption initially 
made by Professor Schwartz to introduce the “puzzle of secured debt” so that the 
earlier creditors cannot “calculate risks of default reasonably precisely”.78  In other 
words, they must be nonadjusting creditors.  But if these lenders are unable to adjust 
their interest rates, then the rational debtor would be induced to borrow from them 
unsecured instead of secured loans to externalize the cost of overinvestment unless it 
is impossible to do so in the debtor’s early life.  In short, this second mechanism will 
become irrelevant if the debtor can borrower unsecured loans from adjusting creditors, 
and it will be inconsistent with the debtor’s borrowing incentive if unsecured loans 
can be obtained from nonadjusting creditors.  Consequently, such a use of secured 
debts to constrain overinvestment only works in a limited situation where the 
borrower cannot acquire unsecured financing from either adjusting or nonadjusting 
lenders.  In fact, some of its advocates do believe the priority awarded to earlier 
lenders is necessary for loans made early in the debtor’s life.79  Yet if a security 
interest with bankruptcy priority is really a precondition for early loans from 
nonadjusting creditors, these lenders would not appear at all, and the inefficient 
externalization of overinvestment costs would not be an issue in the first place, should 
                                                        
78 See supra note 14. 
79 See Kanda & Levmore, supra note 4, at 2113 n25 and accompanying text.  By insisting that 
secured credit is a source of needed liquidity to debtors but not enumerating why such liquidity is 
impossible to be acquired through unsecured borrowing, Professor Steven Schwartz might have at the 
back of his mind a similar concern of market collapse due to information asymmetry, see Schwartz, 
supra note 4, at 442 note 75 and accompanying text (but interestingly, he believes that borrowers will 
reserve their assets for the issuance of secured debts to later, rather than earlier, lenders). 
32 
 
such priority be abolished.80  Moreover, the borrower will only issue secured debts 
early in its life if the market is filled with lenders unwilling to advance unsecured 
credits.  Indeed, in such a market, without reasonable knowledge about the debtor’s 
expected lifespan, no creditor should ever extend unsecured loans.  In this situation, 
essentially, no creditor will be able to play the role of an effective controller of 
overinvestment since none can be sure whether it is in the position of a relatively 
“earlier” or “later” lender.  This prediction is plainly at odds with the reality as we do 
see unsecured lending but not secured debts crammed in borrowers’ early lives.81 
Even if this second mechanism does bridle overinvestment as some have hoped, it 
obviously requires the proper adjustment by later creditors.  Consequently, its 
perceived efficiency effect will not materialize when security is granted to the earlier 
creditor yet the subsequent creditors, such as employees or customers, are unable to 
negotiate interest rates to account for existing debt obligations.  Overinvestment 
follows and wealth is redistributed to the borrower, again, from the nonadjusting 
creditors.  Apparently, the case for the priority of secured claims is not made any 
easier by this second theory of overinvestment-control when we take nonadjusting 
creditors into consideration. 
3. Reducing Incentives to Overinvest 
The last mechanism through which secured lending may be used to control 
overinvestment focuses on the debtor’s incentive, rather than ability, to take up risky 
                                                        
80 What would happen in this context is the underinvestment problem. 
81 See Schwartz, Security Interests, supra note 3, at 22 (criticizing the staggering debt theory of 
secured lending for similar empirical weakness). 
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yet less efficient projects.  It was mentioned by Professor Buckley in his study on 
bankruptcy priority, where he precisely noted that the debtor’s incentive to overinvest 
can rise with the increase in the cost of credit.  As far as security interests help lower 
this cost, he believes that overinvestment should be less serious a problem in the 
context of secured lending.82  However, Professor Buckley seemingly misunderstood 
the exact reason why this could be a merit of secured lending.  I will explain it in 
detail in the next part of this paper, and show that this is indeed a unique efficiency 
advantage of offering priority to secured creditors, which sustains the presence of 
nonadjusting creditors.  Suffice it here to say that the borrower’s incentive to 
overinvest hinges on its entire cost of borrowing, instead of the isolated cost of 
secured debts.  Therefore, in the world of fully informed creditors, one assumed by 
Professor Buckley,83 secured lending will not actually depress the borrower’s avidity 
for overinvestment.  By limiting his emphasis narrowly on the cost of secured debts 
alone, he failed to take into consideration the change in the cost of unsecured debts, 
which will cancel out the supposed incentive effect brought about by the creation of 
security interests.  He also misinterpreted secured lending as a response to the 
preference of fully informed earlier lenders.84  When creditors are truly informed, as 
Professor Buckley himself indicated, the costs imposed by the debtor’s adverse 
                                                        
82 Buckley, supra note 4, at 1430, 1437-38.  My research finds no allusion to this mechanism by other 
law scholars although similar idea was introduced in the economics literature, e.g. Helmut Bester, The 
Role of Collateral in Credit Markets with Imperfect Information, 31 EUROPEAN ECON. REV. 887, 
895-97 (1987). 
83 Buckley, supra note 4, at 1426. 
84 Id. at 1437-38. 
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incentives will be borne by the debtor itself.85  So creditors should be indifferent 
whether secured or not.  Then, it must be the debtor’s call to take advantage of the 
reduction in cost of credit, if any, as a consequence of issuing secured debts. 
 
E. Summary 
The brief literature review above indicates that the existing theories on the 
efficiency of secured lending are not sufficient to make the case less uneasy for the 
bankruptcy priority accompanying with secured claims.  Some of them do not entail 
a requirement for priority (signaling, asset substitution).  Others fail to withstand the 
presence of nonadjusting creditors (monitoring, leverage, draining subsequent 
borrowing), even if they could be persuasive otherwise.  The only promising 
candidate left, the incentive effect on overinvestment, seems incomplete and 
somewhat misleading in its current version, and may have exaggerated the potential 
efficiency of secured lending.  To this final point I am now turning. 
 
IV. The Paradoxes of Secured Lending 
 As reviewed in the previous Part, no existing theory has managed to, 
satisfactorily, make the case less uneasy for the priority of secured claims in 
bankruptcy when some creditors do not adjust interest rates to reflect the increased 
risk associated with their loans after issuance of secured debts.  However, one effect 
of secured lending is lost, somewhat surprisingly, in most legal writings on this topic: 
                                                        
85 Id. at 1426. 
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To the extent that secured lending lowers the cost of capital, it can disincentivize the 
borrower to engage in overinvestment.86  This merit does count on the priority of 
secured debts for the borrower’s cost of credit can be reduced only if secured lenders 
enjoy more favorable status in bankruptcy proceedings,87 hence ready to charge lower 
interest rates.  It also sustains the presence of nonadjusting creditors, who will not 
alter the interest charges for their credits while secured creditors are cutting down 
theirs.  As a result, the borrower’s total burden of debt declines. 
 This rarely explored virtue of secured lending exhibits two paradoxes, however.  
For one thing, the efficiency of secured debts seems so entangled with their 
distributional impacts that any attempt to rein in the latter can only be done at the 
sacrifice of the former.  For another, while secured debts remove the borrower’s 
motivation to overinvest under certain circumstances, they also inspire the borrower 
to invest excessively under other circumstances. 
 To focus on the incentive effects resulting from the varying cost of credit, I put 
aside in this Part other costs involved in using secured debts.  So the cost of issuing 
secured debts, the possibility of creditor’s monitoring, as well as the borrower’s 
ability to take precaution against tort damages are all ignored for the moment.88 
A. The Primary Paradox: Efficiency Residing in Distribution 
                                                        
86 As noted, Professor Buckley is the one exception that noticed this efficiency effect of secured 
lending, but with conspicuous flaws.  See supra note 82-85 and accompanying text. 
87 This is not to deny that the in rem nature of security and the right of foreclosure may also help bring 
down the interest rates charged by secured creditors.  But without the priority in bankruptcy, the 
decrease in interest rates of secured loans is probably negligible.  It is the bankruptcy priority feature 
that directly addresses the risk of lending, which determines the risk premium, a major component of 
loan interests. 
88 These costs will be considered in Part V infra. 
36 
 
Overinvesting incentives dwindle as the cost of capital drops.  Yet secured 
lending can achieve this only if the unsecured creditors do not raise their interest rates.  
In other words, the overinvestment problem can be eased only if two conditions are 
met simultaneously: Secured creditors enjoy priority in bankruptcy and unsecured 
creditors are nonadjusting. 
1. Decrease in Interest Rates 
When debtors invest in risky projects, they will keep the return from such 
investment, after paying back the principals and interests of loans, if these projects 
succeed.  But under the limited liability regime, debtors only bear the costs of 
investment to the extent of the value of their assets in case of an investment failure, 
and any remaining cost will be shifted to their creditors.  So, essentially, debtors are 
gambling with other people’s money.  Rational debtors, of course, would want to 
keep the expected repayment obligation to their creditors as low as possible while 
deriving gain as much returns from their investments as possible.  As between two 
investment options, one with a higher probability of failure and lower expected value 
than the other, the riskier one benefits the debtor by scaling down its expected 
repayment to the creditor because the probability of success, and thus of making full 
repayment, shrinks.  At the same time, however, this riskier option may also leave 
the debtor with lower return when it does succeed since its expected value is less than 
the relatively safer project.  Consequently, faced with these two choices, the debtor 
has to weigh the cost and benefit of investing in the riskier project, and will opt for it 
as long as the benefit is greater.  As the interest rate rises, the debtor’s expected 
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saving from the riskier investment project grows since it sends the probability of the 
debtor actually repaying the loan in full even lower.89  And this renders the safer 
option increasingly unappealing to the debtor.  Therefore, the higher the interest rate 
charged for the loan, the more incentivized the borrower will be to invest in risky but 
inefficient projects. 
Some notations can be used to further clarify the idea.  Consider a risk-neural 
firm with an initial wealth of W.  It is choosing between two investment projects, 
requiring the same amount of cost C, which will be financed by borrowing from a 
fully adjusting and risk-neutral creditor at the interest of RCi, where the subscript i 
indicates the project actually chosen by the firm.  RCi varies depending on whether 
the loan is secured, so it can be written as RCi(S), where S = 1 if C is secured, and S = 
0 if not.90.  Project 1 yields a return of x1 when it succeeds with a probability of p1 
while Project 2 brings in x2 in case of success which has a probability of p2.  When 
they fail, neither generates any return.  Suppose Project 1 is more efficient and less 
risky, in other words, p1x1 > p2x2 and p1 > p2.  Consequently, the creditor will ask for 
                                                        
89 To put differently, the borrower’s expected repayment obligation grows as the committed amount of 
interest rises while the riskiness of investment keeps constant.  In this sense, the borrower can be 
viewed as internalizing a lower portion of the value of investment with the increase in interest rate.  
Professor Buckley presents this intuition in a similar way: “As the cost of credit rises, a greater portion 
of firm value is assigned to creditors, and the firm’s temptation to gamble with other people’s money 
increases accordingly”, supra note 4, at 1430.  This statement, though also catches the thrust of the 
issue, seems less explicit about the tradeoff confronted by the borrower in choosing between high risk 
and low risk projects. 
90 Although the firm can choose to secure any proportion of C in principle, it should secure the loan as 
fully as possible in that the interest rate of C decreases with the increase in the collateral used to secure 
the loan and the firm’s payoff rises with the decrease in interest charge given that N and RN are fixed. 
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higher, or at least the same,91 rate of interest if it knows Project 2 is to be picked, all 
else being equal, i.e. RC1 ≤ RC2.92  Also assume the firm’s other creditors have a total 
credit of N charging a fixed amount of interest of RN.  The firm has enough wealth to 
fully secure C,93 but in case of investment failure, it will not be able to repay its entire 
debts,94 i.e. C ≤ W < C + N. 
Under these setups, the firm’s expected payoff from investing in Project 1 is 
 p1(x1-C-RC1-N-RN+W).           (1)                   
However, since even the adjusting creditor cannot know which project is eventually 
undertaken after the loan is advanced, the firm will be ready to pick this less risky 
project only if 
  p1(x1-C-RC1-N-RN+W) > p2(x2-C-RC1-N-RN+W). 
Otherwise, it will be better off by promising to invest in Project 1 but actually 
investing in the riskier Project 2.  In the parlance of economics, it is not incentive 
compatible for the firm to choose Project 1 when the interest of the loan is RC1 and 
  p1(x1-C-RC1-N-RN+W) ≤ p2(x2-C-RC1-N-RN+W).     (2) 
As long as (2) is satisfied, we will see the firm invest in the inefficient Project 2.  
Since an adjusting creditor is informed of the parameter of these projects and 
understands the borrower’s investment strategy, it will charge RC2 as the interest of 
                                                        
91 When the loan is fully secured, risk of investment failure will not matter in determining the amount 
of interests. 
92 Without loss of generality, suppose the rate of return for riskless loans is zero.  Then, the interest 
charged for a risky loan can be written as R = (1-p)(C-T)/p where p is the probability of success, C is 
the amount of loan, and T is the amount recoverable in case of failure.  Obviously R increases as p 
becomes lower. 
93 Relaxing this assumption will not change the conclusions of this paper. 
94 Otherwise the loan is riskless, which renders the security unnecessary. 
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the loan, assuming that the riskier investment still makes the firm better off than status 
quo.95  The firm might fare better if it could commit itself credibly to Project 1 and 
pay a lower interest of RC1, but since it is unable to do so,96 the sole choice left is to 
take the loan with a higher interest and undertake the riskier project.97  This welfare 
loss exactly results from the agency cost of debt financing when costless monitoring 
is impossible.  After rearrangement, the condition under which the inefficient 
overinvestment emerges can be written as 
  p1x1-p2x2 ≤ (p1-p2)(C+RC1+N+RN-W).        (3) 
The left hand side of (3) shows the firm’s cost of opting for a riskier project, which is 
the decrease in its expected gains from the investment.  The right hand side is the 
benefit to be expected from the riskier project, which is the decrease in its expected 
repayment to the creditors.  As the benefit exceeds the cost, the firm will go after the 
investment project with higher risk and lower expected value.  The inequality (3) 
evidently tells us that the firm’s benefit from overinvesting in Project 2 expands as its 
promised repayment, C+RC1+N+RN, increases, other things being equal. 
 Since p1 > p2, we can divide both sides of (3) by p1-p2, and get 
  (p1x1-p2x2)/(p1-p2) ≤ C+RC1+N+RN-W.        (4) 
                                                        
95 To be specific, I assume W-N-RN < p2[x2-C-RC2(0)-N-RN+W].  This assumption will be relaxed in 
B. of this Part.  In addition, note that under the regime of limited liability, both W-N-RN and 
pi[xi-C-RCi-N-RN+W] should be nonnegative. 
96 Note that the adjusting creditor cannot costlessly control the borrower’s investment decisions made 
between the time the debt is issued and its maturity.  As monitoring is not to be considered in this 
section, adjusting interest rates becomes the only way to deal with the risk of lending. 
97 It is not incentive compatible for the firm to choose Project 1 when RC2 is charged and (2) is 
satisfied.  Given (2), we have p1x1 - p2x2 - (p1-p2)(C+N+RN-W) ≤ (p1-p2)RC1.  At the same time, since 




Let’s define the left hand side of inequality (4) as D.  The value of D varies with the 
specific characteristics of the potential projects denoted by p’s and x’s.  But no 
matter what exactly these p’s and x’s might be, the condition for the firm to prefer the 
riskier project represented by (4) will be easier to satisfy as the value of the right hand 
side increases.  Since C, N, RN, and W are all fixed by assumption, the firm’s 
incentive to overinvest strengthens as RC1, the amount of interest charged by the 
lender to finance the less risky project, goes up.98 
 As already noted, secured lending contributes to reducing loan interests in that the 
priority granted to secured lenders in bankruptcy attenuates the risk of their loans.  
This can be readily proved if by adding a few more assumptions to the previous 
model.  For simplicity, but without loss of generality, suppose that the riskless rate of 
return is zero.  Then a fully secured lender enjoying unimpaired priority will charge 
a zero interest.  But if unsecured and subject to pro rata distribution in bankruptcy, 
the lender will charge a positive amount of interest.  Using the notations, we can 
write RC1(1) = 0, and RC1(0) = C(1-p1)[1-W/(C+N)]/p1.99  Therefore, secured lending 
induces the firm to invest in Project 2 if 
                                                        
98 Suppose p’s and x’s are all random variables, then D itself is a random variable.  If we write out its 
cumulative distribution function as F(d), then the probability for the firm to opt for the riskier and 
inefficient Project 2 is simply F(C+RC+N+RN-W), which rises with the value of the right hand side of 
(4).  In fact, this is just a simplified demonstration of a more general proposition that as the promised 
debt payment increases, the debtor increases monotonically the risk of its investment strategy, which 
was first suggested by Jensen and Meckling in their seminal paper on agency cost of debt financing 
(see Jensen & Meckling, supra note 31).  For a more general proof of this proposition, see Green & 
Talmor, supra note 31. 
99 Solve p1[C+RC1(0)] + (1-p1)[W*C/(C+N)] = C.  For simplicity, I assume that the interest of either 
credit, C or N, has not accrued when the investment fails and the firm files bankruptcy, so neither is 
included in calculating the bankruptcy claims, see 11 U.S.C. §502(b)(2). 
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D ≤ C+N+RN-W,             (5) 
whereas unsecured lending drives it to choose this riskier project if 
D ≤ C+C(1-p1)[1-W/(C+N)]/p1+N+RN-W.       (6) 
Compared with secured lending, unsecured lending tends to inflate the likelihood that 
the inefficient Project 2 is selected since C(1-p1)[1-W/(C+N)]/p1 will be nonnegative 
given p1 < 1 and W < C + N. 
2. Presence of Nonadjusting Creditors 
As inequalities (3) and (4) clearly manifest, the debtor’s benefit from carrying out 
the riskier project depends on the entire amount of repayment to all creditors, both 
secured and unsecured.  The debtor’s incentive to overinvest cannot be attenuated if 
the unsecured creditors raise their interest rates to compensate for the hoisted risk 
owing to the issuance of secured debts.  When unsecured creditors are fully adjusting, 
the debtor’s savings in interest payment for secured loans will just be cancelled out by 
the additional charges made to account for the extra risk of unsecured credits.  As a 
result, the total cost of credit remains unchanged.  This is why I have kept the value 
of RN frozen in the preceding analysis.  In brief, the efficiency of secured lending in 
discouraging overinvestment will occur only if, at least some, unsecured creditors do 
not peg their interest rates to the debtor’s use of secured debts.100 
                                                        
100 This can be easily observed if we extend the previous model by allowing the interest of N, RNi, to 
change based on whether the finance for investment is obtained as a secured loan.  If the loan is fully 
secured, as stated above, RCi(1) is zero, and RNi(1) can be solved from pi(N+RNi) + (1-pi)(W-C) = N, 
which is (1-pi)(C+N-W)/pi.  So the necessary condition for the firm to opt for Project 2, when secured 
lending is used, is D ≤ C + N + RC1 + RN1 – W = C + N + 0 + (1-p1)(C+N-W)/p1 – W.  On the other 
hand, if an unsecured loan is used to finance the investment project, both creditors will be subject to 
pro rata distributions once the borrower goes bankrupt.  Hence, RCi(0) is the solution to pi(C+RCi) + 
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Our study so far has made clear the following two interlinked points.  First, 
secured lending, with its priority in bankruptcy, can promote efficiency by moderating 
the borrower’s incentive to overinvest.  Second, this efficiency effect, however, 
relies precisely on the existence of nonadjusting creditors.  To put it differently, 
efficiency of secured lending goes hand in hand with its distributional effects.  These 
two facets of the welfare impact lead to the primary paradox of secured lending. 
The intuition behind this paradox is easy to understand.  It is, indeed, 
foreshadowed by “the puzzle of secured debt”.  Secured lending should generate no 
social benefit insofar as risk-neural creditors have homogenous expectation about 
default probability, can assess the risks of default reasonably accurately, and adjust 
interest rates based on this assessment.101  Hence, any efficiency of secured lending 
must be a consequence of a deviation from the prototype creditor.  If the empirically 
ambiguous features of this prototype, risk-neutrality and homogenous expectation, are 
put aside, we would be left to look to creditors’ weaknesses in evaluating default risk 
and accounting for it in interest rates for a possible source of the efficiency of secured 
lending. 
Surprisingly, however, most law scholars have never mentioned the advantage of 
security interests in bridling the borrower’s incentive, rather than ability, to invest in 
                                                                                                                                                               
(1-pi)[W*C/(C+N)] = C, and similarly, RNi(0) can be calculated by solving pi(N+RNi) + 
(1-pi)[W*N/(C+N)] = N, which is N(1-pi)[1-W/(C+N)]/pi.  Accordingly, in case of unsecured lending 
the necessary condition for the firm to choose the riskier project becomes D ≤ C + N + RC1(0) + RN1(0) 
– W, and the right hand side of this inequality turns out to be C + N + (1-p1)(C+N-W)/p1 – W, too.  In 
short, as far as all creditors are adjusting, the total cost of credit converges no matter whether the loan 
used to finance the investment is secured or not, and the firm will choose the same investment project.  
101 See supra note 14. 
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an excessively risky way, and for those who did mention it, the paradoxical nature of 
this incentive effect was plainly neglected.102  This oversight might have resulted in 
exaggeration of the efficiency of secured lending.  The primary paradox evinces that 
– to borrow two terms from Professor Buckley – the “soft defenses of secured 
lending” has difficulty staying at peace with the “hard defenses of secured 
lending”,103 at least in terms of control over the borrower’s adverse incentives.104  
While accentuating the triviality of its distributional effects, the soft defenses are 
inevitably undermining the merit of secured lending in constraining overinvestment 
for the insignificant loss suffered by nonadjusting creditors necessarily implies a 
minor incentive efficiency stemming from the issuance of secured debts.  Moreover, 
it is a particularly forceful strike against his hard defenses when Professor Buckley 
suggested superpriority rights as a remedy for distributional disadvantage suffered by 
tort creditors.105  Allowing these truly nonadjusting creditors to prevail over all other 
creditors in bankruptcy will certainly raise secured lenders’ interest charges, without 
any counteractive decrease in the amount of bankruptcy claims held by the tort 
claimants.  The borrower’s total cost of credit, therefore, is bound to grow, which, as 
                                                        
102 As aforementioned, Professor Buckley apparently forgot this issue in his discussion about the 
influence of security interests on borrowers’ adverse incentives.  It seems that the importance of 
nonadjusting creditors in discouraging overinvestment is largely ignored by financial economists as 
well, see e.g. Bester, supra note 82. 
103 Soft defenses aim at qualifying the distributional impacts of secured lending, while the hard 
defenses at illuminating its efficiency benefit, see Buckley, supra note 4, at 1404-39. 
104 The primary paradox may exist, though probably in an obscure manner, in the context of screening 
efficiency also, which is Professor Buckley’s another hard defense of secured lending, see Part VI B. 
infra.  
105 Id. at 1406. 
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Professor Buckley himself admitted, will spark even more overinvestment. 106  
Although the proposal is made to strengthen his soft defenses, it efficaciously 
defeated his own commendation for secured lending as a constraint on overinvestment 
when secured lenders are dwarfed by super-secured tort creditors.  This contradiction 
in viewpoints is probably attributable once again to the lack of awareness of the 
primary paradox associated with secured lending.  
 
B. Secondary Paradox: Exacerbating and Alleviating Overinvestment 
Ironically, secured lending not only alleviates the overinvestment problem but can 
exacerbate it as well.  The reason for this ostensible contradiction rests on the fact 
that the lower cost of credit allows the borrower both to better internalize the value of 
investment, and to have easier access to credits.  This latter effect feeds the 
borrower’s appetite for inefficient investments that would not be financed without the 
option of secured lending.107  In the legal literature, these conflicting effects of 
secured lending have been treated separately.  While some writers blame it for 
encouraging inefficient investments, a few others praise it for curbing borrower’s 
adverse incentives.108  Amazingly, however, no effort has been made to link them 
coherently and present a less partial view of secured financing. 
Let’s continue with the model set up in A.1 of Part IV.  Up to now, I have 
assumed that the firm, when borrows unsecured, can still reap a positive net gain even 
                                                        
106 Id. at 1430. 
107 E.g. Triantis Free-Cash-Flow, supra note 77, at 2163. 
108 Buckley, supra note 4, at 1430. 
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if it chooses the riskier yet less efficient investment project and pays a higher interest, 
or W-N-RN < p2[x2-C-RC2(0)-N-RN+W].109  So, be it secured or not, the firm will 
borrow a loan from the adjusting creditor in any event.  But once we relax this 
assumption, it becomes clear that sometimes the firm will not borrow at all if a 
secured loan is not available because the interest rate will be too high to justify any 
investment.  When it is socially inefficient to invest in certain potential projects, i.e. 
their expected values lower than their costs, secured lending nonetheless facilitates the 
financing of such undesirable investments. 
 We can write out the complete conditions for the firm to undertake the two 
projects.  It picks Project 1 only if 
  p1(x1-C-RC1-N-RN+W) > p2(x2-C-RC1-N-RN+W), and    (7) 
  W-N-RN < p1(x1-C-RC1-N-RN+W).         (8) 
The firm chooses Project 2 when 
  p1(x1-C-RC1-N-RN+W) ≤ p2(x2-C-RC1-N-RN+W), and    (2) 
  W-N-RN < p2(x2-C-RC2-N-RN+W).         (9) 
Finally, the firm will choose not to borrow at all if 
  p1(x1-C-RC1-N-RN+W) > p2(x2-C-RC1-N-RN+W), and    (7) 
W-N-RN ≥ p1(x1-C-RC1-N-RN+W);110 or if       (10) 
  p1(x1-C-RC1-N-RN+W) ≤ p2(x2-C-RC1-N-RN+W), and    (2) 
                                                        
109 See supra note 95. 
110 When the inequalities (7) and (10) are satisfied, it must be true that p2(x2-C-RC2-N-RN+W) < 
W-N-RN (Given (7), p1x1-p2x2 – (p1-p2)(C+N+RN-W) – (p1-p2)RC1 > 0; since (p1-p2)RC1 – (p1RC1-p2RC2) 
= p2(RC2-RC1) ≥ 0, p1x1-p2x2 – (p1-p2)(C+N+RN-W) – (p1RC1-p2RC2) > 0, i.e. p2(x2-C-RC2-N-RN+W) < 
p1(x1-C-RC1-N-RN+W)).  Therefore, the firm is not willing to invest in Project 2, either. 
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  W-N-RN ≥ p2(x2-C-RC2-N-RN+W);  or if       (11)  
  W-N-RN ≥ p1(x1-C-RC1-N-RN+W), and        (10) 
  W-N-RN ≥ p2(x2-C-RC2-N-RN+W).         (11)  
 In A.1 of this Part, I have shown that secured lending disincentivizes 
overinvestment when the firm can gain from investing in risky projects even if it has 
to pay the higher amount of interest, RC2(0).  Now I will explore the opposite case.  
When it does not pay to invest in Project 2 with an unsecured loan, i.e. W-N-RN ≥ 
p2[x2-C-RC2(0)-N-RN+W], three scenarios need to be considered: a) It does not pay, 
either, to invest in Project 1 with an unsecured loan, or W-N-RN ≥ 
p1[x1-C-RC1(0)-N-RN+W]; b) it pays to invest in Project 1 with an unsecured loan, but 
the firm cannot credibly commit to undertake this investment if the interest is set at 
RC1(0), i.e. W-N-RN < p1[x1-C-RC1(0)-N-RN+W] and p1[x1-C-RC1(0)-N-RN+W] ≤ 
p2[x2-C-RC1(0)-N-RN+W]; c) it pays to invest in Project 1 with an unsecured loan, and 
the firm can credibly commit itself to this investment if the interest is set at RC1(0), i.e. 
W – N – RN < p1[x1 – C – RC1(0) – N – RN + W] and p1[x1 – C – RC1(0) – N – RN + W] 
> p2[x2 – C – RC1(0) – N – RN + W].  The firm will not want to borrow and invest in 
scenarios a) and b) if secured borrowing is impossible;111 in scenario c), it will invest 
in Project 1.112  
In the event that neither project is socially efficient, i.e. p2x2 < p1x1 < C, 
investment in either of them is undesirable.  In scenario a), secured lending lowers 
                                                        
111 Inequalities (10) and (11) are satisfied in scenario a), and inequalities (2) and (11) are satisfied in 
scenario b). 
112 Inequalities (7) and (8) are satisfied in scenario c). 
47 
 
the interests charged by the adjusting creditor, so it raises the probabilities that (7), (8) 
and (9) will be satisfied, which means the firm becomes more likely to undertake one 
of these investments.  Similarly, in scenario b), secured lending makes (7) and (9) 
easier to be satisfied, so that the firm will also become more enthusiastic about 
investing in one of those two projects.  In scenario c), secured lending increases the 
likelihood of (9) being satisfied, but this will not influence the firm’s investment 
decision.  As a whole, therefore, secured lending tends to encourage overinvestment 
when the firm is presented with only inefficient investment opportunities, and is not 
willing to borrow unsecured loans to finance the riskier project. 
 Secured lending can exacerbate the overinvestment problem in another case after 
we abandon the assumption W-N-RN < p2[x2-C-RC2(0)-N-RN+W].  When only the 
less risky Project 1 is socially efficient, i.e. p1x1 > C > p2x2, we hope to have Project 1, 
but not Project 2, undertaken.  Yet secured lending seems to be an awkward tool to 
achieve this goal.  In both scenarios a) and b), secured lending, by reducing the 
amount of interests, enhances the probability of inequality (9) being satisfied.  
Nevertheless, the reduction in interests may not be so significant as to meet the 
condition (7).  Consequently, sometimes we will have a case where inequalities (2) 
and (9) are satisfied after a secured debt is used, hence the inefficient Project 2, rather 
than Project 1, is undertaken.113  In general, as shown by the inequality (4), secured 
                                                        
113 In both scenarios a) and b), the decrease in interest may also cause the concurrent satisfaction of 
inequalities (7) and (8) so that the desirable outcome emerges.  These are the cases where secured 
lending helps overcome the underinvestment problem, which will be touched upon later in this paper.  
Moreover, secured lending might render conditions (2) and (8) satisfied in scenario a), and condition (9) 
met in situation c), neither of which will lead to different investment decisions though. 
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lending tends to worsen the overinvesting incentive when the borrower is 
encountering such an investment opportunity set that the ratio of the difference in 
expected values to the difference in success probabilities is too low to attract the 
borrower to the efficient project anyway while the lower interest charged by a secured 
lender makes the inefficient project appealing to the same borrower. 
 To complete our analysis, let’s look at the case in which both investment projects 
generate net gains to the society (C < p2x2 < p1x1), yet W – N – RN ≥ p2[x2 – C – RC2 – 
N – RN + W].  Clearly, allowing for secured lending here will not give rise to any 
concern for overinvestment.  If the more efficient project 1 is picked even when the 
loan is unsecured, using secured debts should not alter the borrower’s decision.  If 
neither project will be undertaken without a secured loan, then the lower interest 
charged by a secured lender raises the probability that one of these efficient projects 
will be undertaken.114 
 The numeric illustrations below demonstrate the two aforementioned 
circumstances in which secured lending may exacerbate the overinvestment problem. 
 Example 1  Firm is a risk-neural debtor.  The value of Firm’s own assets, which 
can be used as collateral, is $1,000, and this value doesn’t change with the outcome of 
prospective investments.  Suppose the interest rate for a risk free loan is zero.  At t0, 
Firm issues a debt of $1,000, secured or unsecured, to a risk-neural adjusting Creditor 
2 in order to finance the investment in one of the following two projects.  Project 1 
has an upside of $1,800, and its probability of success is 50%.  The upside of Project 
                                                        
114 In this case, secured lending can enhance social welfare by alleviating the underinvestment problem, 
see Part VI A. infra. 
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2 is $8,400, and its probability of success is 10%.  If failed, both projects yield 
nothing.  Firm makes a choice between these two projects at t1, after the debt is 
issued.  The outcomes of these projects become clear at t2.  In addition, Firm’s 
another creditor, Creditor 1, has an outstanding unsecured credit of $500 and is 
completely ignorant of the riskiness of its credit, so it charges zero interest regardless 
of Firm’s investment and financing strategies.  Firm’s obligations to both creditors 
mature at t2, and it will go bankrupt if the total amount of debt obligations exceeds its 
asset value.115  Finally, to focus on the overinvestment incentive caused by secured 
lending, assume awarding security interests is costless. 
 Obviously, neither Project 1 nor Project 2 is worth pursing from the social 
perspective.  Nevertheless, Firm will choose to invest in Project 2 if it can obtain a 
secured loan from Creditor 2.  When secured, Creditor 2 will ask for zero interest 
since its loan is riskless under this circumstance.  Then, Firm’s net gain from Project 
1 will be 50%(1,800 – 1,000 – 500 + 1,000) – (1,000 – 500) = $150, but this gain will 
be even greater if it invests in Project 2, which amounts to 10%(8,400 – 1,000 – 500 + 
1,000) – (1,000 – 500) = $290. 
When unsecured, on the contrary, Creditor 2 will expect to receive a pro rata 
distribution in the event of Firm’s bankruptcy.  This forces it to adjust the interest 
rates to reflect the riskiness of the loan.  If Firm invests in Project 1, Creditor 2 
should charge an interest of $333, the solution to the equation 50%(1,000 + r) + 
50%*1,000*1,000/(500 + 1,000) = 1,000 where r stands for the amount of interest.  
                                                        




However, if the interest is indeed set at $333, Firm will be better off by investing in 
Project 2 since 10%(8,400 – 1,000 – 500 – 333 + 1,000) – (1,000 – 500) = $256.7, 
greater than 50%(1,800 – 1,000 – 500 – 333 + 1,000) – (1,000 – 500) = -$16.5.  
Knowing this, Creditor 2 will be willing to lend unsecured only if the amount of 
interest is $3,000, the solution to 10%(1,000 + r) + 90%*1,000*1,000/(500 + 1,000) = 
1,000.  But then Firm will not want to invest at all because neither project will 
generate a positive gain compared to the status quo.116  Therefore, the inefficient 
investment can be avoided if secured lending is not permitted. 
Example 2  Suppose the upside of Project 1 rises to $2,050 and all other settings 
are the same as the previous example. 
Now Project 1 is socially efficient since its expected value is greater than its cost.  
But secured lending will still prompt Firm to invest in the inefficient Project 2 since, 
given the probabilities of success, the expected value of Project 1 is not high enough 
to appeal to the borrower.117  When a secured debt is used and Creditor 2 charges 
zero interest, Firm’s net gain from the two projects can be calculated, respectively, as 
50%(2,050 – 1,000 – 500 + 1,000) – (1,000 – 500) = $275 and 10%(8,400 – 1,000 – 
500 + 1,000) – (1,000 – 500) = $290.  From Firm’s point of view, Project 2 is 
obviously preferable to Project 1, notwithstanding the fact that the society will suffer 
a net loss of $160 from the former. 
Same as in Example 1, Firm will refrain from investing if secured lending is not 
                                                        
116 Firm’s net gain from Project 2 will be 10%(8,400 – 1,000 – 500 – 3,000 + 1,000) – 500 = -$10, and 
its net gain from Project 1 even lower. 
117 In this example, Project 1 will be more attractive if its expected value is greater than $1,040, or, its 
upside greater than $2,080. 
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an option.  An unsecured Creditor 2 will again ask for an interest of $3,000,118 
leaving Firm a net loss with either investment project.  Consequently, in this case, 
secured lending triggers an incentive to overinvest as well.119 
So far, I have depicted the secondary paradox of secured lending: It will both 
discourage and encourage overinvestment when the law allows the borrower to grant 
security interests at will.  This paradox is secondary in the sense that it is a 
ramification of the fact that the distributional effect is a necessary condition for the 
adverse-incentive-undermining efficiency of secured lending, the thrust of the primary 
paradox.  In terms of its effect on overinvestment, the two opposite momentums of 
secured lending both stem from its distributional impact.  Generally speaking, since 
W – N - RN ≥ p2[x2 – C - RC2 – N – RN + W] is a necessary condition for secured debts 
to encourage overinvestment, and this condition is more likely to be met as p2x2 
decreases,120 secured lending will be increasingly undesirable, in terms of its effect 
on the borrower’s overinvesting incentive, as the expected value of the riskier 
investment project decreases. 
This secondary paradox implies that mechanisms to insulate nonadjusting 
creditors from distributional effects might constrain overinvestment in some situations, 
probably when the borrower only has investment opportunities with relatively low 
returns.  Yet in other situations, these mechanisms can nonetheless strengthen 
                                                        
118 Note that the probability of failure is the same as in Example 1, so the amount of interest will not 
change, either.  Again, setting the interest at $333, Creditor 2 will see Firm opt for Project 2. 
119 It is worth noting, though, disallowing the use of secured debts triggers an unexplored opportunity 
of investment in a positive NPV project, i.e. the problem of underinvestment, which will be discussed 
later. 
120 As x2-C-RC2-N-RN+W ≥ 0 due to limited liability, p2(x2-C-RC2-N-RN+W) drops with both p2 and x2. 
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overinvesting incentives in that the borrower’s overall cost of capital rises as 
nonadjusting creditors are protected from cost externalization.  Bebchuk and Fried’s 
proposal of partial priority is one of the distribution-preventing mechanisms.121  
With the demotion of secured creditors in the rank of bankruptcy distribution, the vice 
of security is dispelled, but so is its virtue.  Another frequently suggested mechanism 
confers superpriority on tort creditors.122  By the same token, however, it is expected 
to alleviate overinvestment in some circumstances while exacerbate the problem in 
others.123  There also seems to be a widespread belief that awarding priority to prior 
creditors restricts overinvestment by the borrower.124  Nevertheless, if the prior 
creditor is nonadjusting, the first-in-time priority will carry the same paradoxical 
effects on overinvestment.  Therefore, perhaps it is premature to recommend the 
“internalizing” legal mechanisms before we have a clearer idea about the magnitudes 
of their contradictory impacts. 
 
V. Major Costs of the Paradoxical Secured Lending Revisited 
 The paradoxes presented above remind us of the uncomfortable fact that secured 
                                                        
121 See Bebchuk & Fried, Uneasy Case 1, supra note 5, at 904-13; see also Bebchuk & Fried, Uneasy 
Case 2, supra note 5, at 1323-37; 
122 See the literature cited in supra note 7 for details of the suggestion. 
123 To illustration, consider the following variant of Example 1.  Let the upsides of Project 1 and 
Project 2 rise respectively to $3,000 and $12,000, all other conditions being the same.  When Creditor 
1 is entitled to superpriority, Firm will not bother to create a security interest for Creditor 2, so the latter 
will charge an interest of $4,500 (note that a $500 interest cannot induce Firm to stick to Project 1).  
At this interest rate, Firm is incentivized to pick the less efficient Project 2.  On the contrary, if 
Creditor 1 is not protected by superpriority, Firm can grant Creditor 2 a security, in which case Creditor 
2’s interest charge drops to zero, and the more efficient Project 1 will be undertaken. 
124 E.g. Adler, Secured Credit, supra note 50, at 406; Trianis, Free-Cash-Flow, supra note 77, at 2163; 
Kanda & Levmore, supra note 4, at 2113. 
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lending is a double-edged sword: It may benefit our society as a whole, but only if 
some of its members suffer a loss; it improves our well-being sometimes, but causes 
damages at others.  This is true even if the secured credits, with priority in 
bankruptcy, influence only the borrowers’ investment strategies.  However, their 
force is certainly beyond that.  Section C. of Part II summarized the consequences 
when secured lending distributes welfare among the relevant parties.  In this section, 
I will illustrate two of these consequences, reduced monitoring efforts and distorted 
precaution incentives, with some numerical examples to figure out the factors 
deserving special attention as we balance the costs and benefits of security.  Adding 
these elements is bound to complicate our calculus of the efficiency of secured 
lending.  Nevertheless, one conclusion can be safely reached that both of these 
additional consequences will compromise the positive effect of secured debts on 
overinvesting incentives, since, compared with unsecured lending, secured lending 
does not seem to encourage the secured creditor’s monitoring efforts or the borrower’s 
precaution against tort losses in any event. 
A. Reduced Monitoring Efforts 
Overinvestment can be contained either through modifying debtors’ incentives, or 
through monitoring their behaviors.  While suppressing debtors’ adverse incentives 
in some contexts, secured debts also tend to weaken lenders’ motivation to monitor.  
In the presence of nonadjusting creditors, the reduced monitoring efforts of secured 
parties enhance the debtor’s chance to invest in an excessively risky manner.  When 
the available investment opportunities impel the borrower to undertake the efficient 
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project only if secured borrowing scales down its total cost of capital, issuance of 
secured debts improves the overall social welfare by saving monitoring costs as well 
as any residual cost of overinvestment due to incomplete monitoring, assuming the 
costs of using secured debts not too high.  In contrast, when secured lending is 
unable to align private and social interests given a certain investment opportunity set, 
unsecured debts may bring about additional monitoring to supress the likelihood of 
overinvestment, or simply cut off the costs originating from the use of secured debts.  
These points can be detected from the following examples. 
Example 3  Firm is a risk-neural debtor.  The value of Firm’s own asset, which 
can be used as collateral, is $1,000, and this value doesn’t change with the outcome of 
prospective investments.  Suppose the interest rate for a risk free loan is zero.  At t0, 
Firm issues a debt of $1,000, secured or unsecured, to a risk-neural adjusting Creditor 
2 in order to finance the investment in one of the following two projects.  Project 1 
has an upside of $3,000, and its probability of success is 50%.  The upside of Project 
2 is $12,000, and its probability of success is 10%.  If failed, both projects yield 
nothing.  Firm makes a choice between these two projects at t1, after the debt is 
issued.  The outcomes of these projects become clear at t2.  In addition, Firm’s 
another creditor, Creditor 1, has an outstanding unsecured credit of $500 and is 
completely ignorant of the riskiness of its credit, so it charges zero interest regardless 
of Firm’s investment and financing strategies.  Firm’s obligations to both creditors 
mature at t2, and it will go bankrupt if the total amount of debt obligations exceeds its 
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asset value.125  Let’s also assume that Creditor 2’s monitoring effort can lower Firm’s 
chance to invest in the riskier Project 2 by 50% at a cost of $50.  Finally, the cost 
involved in issuing a secured debt is $20. 
When Creditor 2’s lending is secured, its loan is subject to no risk under these 
settings, so the creditor is not likely to be inspired to monitor the debtor.126  In this 
case, Firm will choose Project 1 since its net gain from this option is 50%(3,000 – 
1,000 – 500 + 1,000) – (1,000 – 500) – 20 = $730, greater than the net gain from 
Project 2, which equals 10%(12,000 – 1,000 – 500 + 1,000) – (1,000 – 500) – 20 = 
$630.  Accordingly, the social gain, net of the cost, is 50%*3,000 – 1,000 – 20 = 
$480. 
On the other hand, if its loan is unsecured, Creditor 2 will receive a pro rata 
distribution when Firm is bankrupt.  So its prospect of recovering the debt depends 
on Firm’s investment strategy, and Creditor 2 will take into account the cost of 
lending by adjusting the interest charge for the loan.  If Creditor 2 does not monitor 
and Firm is hence free to engage in Project 2, the amount of interest, rn, can be 
calculated by solving the equation, 10%(1,000 + rn) + 90%*1,000*1,000/(500 + 1,000) 
= 1,000, i.e. $3,000. 127   Therefore, Firm’s net gain without monitoring is 
                                                        
125 As in previous examples, the interest of the loan is assumed not to be included in Creditor 2’s 
bankruptcy claim. 
126 In fact, it is Firm who does not want monitoring as the cost of monitoring will be borne eventually 
by Firm, yet no benefit (i.e. any reduction in the amount of loan interest) can be reaped from 
monitoring since the monitor’s loan is already riskless, whether it monitors or not. 
127 rn cannot be the solution to 50%(1,000 + rn) + 50%*1,000*1,000/(500 + 1,000) = 1,000, i.e. $333, 
since it is not incentive compatible for Firm to pick Project 1 at an interest of $333.  Firm’s net gains 
from Project 1 and Project 2, respectively, can be calculated as 50%(3,000 – 1,500 – 333 + 1,000) – 
500 = $583.5 and 10%(12,000 – 1,500 – 333 + 1,000) – 500 = $616.7. 
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10%(12,000 – 1,500 – 3,000 + 1,000) – 500 = $350.  In contrast, if monitoring 
occurs, the interest of the loan, ry, will be $944, the solution to 50%[10%(1,000 + ry) 
+ 90%*1,000*1,000/(500 + 1,000)]  + 50%[50%(1,000 + ry) + 
50%*1,000*1,000/(500 + 1,000)] = 1,000 + 50.128  Firm’s net gain now rises to 
50%*10%(12,000 – 1,500 – 944 + 1,000) + 50%*50%(3,000 – 1,500 – 944 +1,000) – 
500 = $416.8.  In other words, when a secured debt with full priority is not allowed, 
Firm will require monitoring and invest in either project with an equal chance.  As a 
result, the net social payoff is 50%*50%*3,000 + 50%*10%*12,000 – 1,000 – 50 = 
$300.  Obviously, our social welfare increases when secured lending is allowed.  So 
this example presents a case where the balance between overinvestment control and 
monitoring inspiration tilts in favor of the employment of security interests. 
Example 4  Now the upside of the riskier Project 2 turns to $13,200 while all 
other conditions remain the same as Example 3. 
In this case, Firm will choose Project 2 if secured lending is allowed as it will be 
better off by 10%(13,200 – 1,500 + 1,000) – 500 – 20 = $750, rather than $730, the 
net gain from investing in Project 1.  Accordingly, the net social payoff becomes 
10%*13,200 – 1,000 – 20 = $300. 
If Creditor 2 cannot obtain priority in bankruptcy via secured lending, however, 
Firm will require monitoring by Creditor 2 so that there is only a 50% chance that it 
invests in Project 2.  This can be seen from the following calculation.  Since 
                                                        
128 It can be verified that when the interest charged is $944, Firm is still better off by investing in 
Project 2 (50%(3,000 – 1,500 – 944 + 1,000) – 500 = $278 < 10%(12,000 – 1,500 – 944 + 1,000) – 500 
= $555.6) if it is at all possible. 
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Creditor 2’s risk of lending stays unchanged, monitoring or not, as in the previous 
example, it will continue to charge rn=$3,000 when it monitors, and ry=$944 when it 
does not.  Under this interest schedule, Firm will invest in Project 2 for sure without 
monitoring, hence its net gain is 10%(13,200 – 1,500 – 3,000 + 1,000) – 500 = $470.  
On the other hand, Firm will lose 50% possibility to pick the riskier project if Creditor 
2 monitors, but its net gain will rise to 50%*10%(13,200 – 1,500 – 944 + 1,000) + 
50%*50%(3,000 – 1,500 – 944 + 1,000) – 500 = $476.8.  Therefore, we can force 
Firm to accept monitoring by removing the priority status held by secured lenders, 
and the social welfare will be enhanced consequently, for the net social gain is 
50%*50%*3,000 + 50%*10%*13,200 – 1,000 – 50 = $360, $60 higher than if 
security interests with full priority are permitted.  In this example, we are presented 
with a situation where the tradeoff between monitoring and overinvestment control 
leads to a case for abandoning the full priority of secured claims in bankruptcy. 
 Example 5  Imagine the upside of the riskier Project 2 goes up to $14,000, and 
all other conditions remain the same as Example 3. 
Now, Firm will always invest in Project 2 for sure, be it borrowing secured or not.  
If secured loan is used, Project 2 yields a net private gain of 10%(14,000 – 1,500 + 
1,000) – 500 – 20 = $830 while Project 1 still yields $730.  On the other hand, if 
Creditor 2 is not secured, under the creditor’s surveillance, Firm can reap a net gain of 
50%*10%(14,000 – 1,500 – 944 +1,000) + 50%*50%(3,000 – 1,500 – 944 + 1,000) – 
500 = $516.8 whereas Firm’s net gain will rise to 10%(14,000 – 1,500 – 3,000 + 
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1,000) – 500 = $550 when it is free from monitoring.129 
In this case, we cannot effectively overcome the overinvestment problem in any 
event, so secured and unsecured lending end up supporting the same investment 
strategy.  As issuing secured debts itself is costly, disallowing security interests 
nevertheless improves social welfare: Under secured lending, the net social gain is 
10%*14,000 – 1,000 – 20 = $380, and this net gain becomes 10%*14,000 – 1,000 = 
$400 if no security interest is created. 
The above examples have demonstrated that, when the costs of issuing secured 
debts and monitoring debtor misbehavior are kept constant, the relative efficiency of 
secured vis-à-vis unsecured lending depends on the investment opportunity sets that 
the debtor has.  Therefore, no easy comparison can be made unless we have some 
knowledge about the potential distribution of these opportunity sets.  On the other 
hand, for any given set of investment options, the costs of monitoring and awarding 
security interests determine the efficiency calculus of secured and unsecured lending. 
To illustrate, suppose first, in Example 3, the cost of issuing a secured loan is not 
$20, but $250, other things being equal.  Then, secured lending generates a net social 
gain of 50%*3,000 – 1,000 – 250 = $250, lower than what the society would obtain 
should secured lending be prohibited.130  Second, suppose Creditor 2 is such an 
efficient monitor that, in Example 3, its monitoring, at a cost of $5, can reduce Firm’s 
                                                        
129 Note that the interest charged by Creditor 2 will still be $3,000 when it monitors and $944 if it does 
not since the risk of the unsecured loan remains unchanged throughout these three examples. 
130 Note that Firm will still prefer granting a security interest and investing in Project 1, when secured 
lending is allowed, even if the cost of issuing secured debt rises to $250 because by doing so its net 




chance of investing in Project 2 by 98%.  Accordingly, Creditor 2 will charge an 
interest of ry equal to $354 if its loan is unsecured and it undertakes monitoring.131  
Confronted with such a low-cost monitor, Firm will ask for monitoring voluntarily 
when secured lending is not an option,132 hence the net social gain climbs to 
98%*50%*3,000 + 2%*10%*12,000 – 1,000 – 5 = $489 from $480 when secured 
lending is allowed.  So we fare better in a world without full-priority security. 
 
B. Distorted Incentive to Take Precaution 
 As explained in C.3 of Part II, it has been well understood that secured debts with 
full priority distort the borrower’s decisions to take precaution against potential tort 
damages.  Considering the advantage of suppressing overinvestment, however, the 
relative efficiency of secured vs. unsecured lending again varies from case to case, 
depending on the investment opportunities available to the borrower.  The following 
two examples illustrate the variability in this comparison. 
Example 6 Firm is a risk-neural debtor.  The value of Firm’s own asset, which 
can be used as collateral, is $1000, and this value doesn’t change with the outcome of 
prospective investments.  Suppose the interest rate for a risk free loan is zero.  At t0, 
Firm issues a debt of $1000, secured or unsecured, to a risk-neural adjusting Creditor 
2 in order to finance the investment in one of the following two projects.  Project 1 
                                                        
131  Solve 98%[50%(1,000 + ry) + 50%*1,000*1,000/(500 + 1,000)] + 2%[10%(1,000 + ry) + 
90%*1,000*1,000/(500 + 1,000)] = 1,000 + 5 
132 This strategy brings Firm a net gain of 98%*50%(3,000 – 1,500 – 354 + 1,000) + 2%*10%(12,000 
– 1,500 – 354 + 1,000) – 500 = $573.83 whereas no monitoring and 100% investment in Project 2 still 




has an upside of $4,000, and its probability of success is 50%.  The upside of Project 
2 is $7,200, and its probability of success is 25%.  If failed, both projects yield 
nothing.  Firm makes a choice between these two projects at t1, after the debt is 
issued.  The outcomes of these projects become clear at t2.  Moreover, Firm’s 
operation may cause a harm of $1,500 to another party, Creditor 1, which occurs, 
sometime between t0 and t2, with a 50% chance, but it can incur $500 to take 
precaution at t0 to avoid this harm.  The occurrence of the harm is independent from 
the success of Firm’s investment, and Firm will have to pay $1,500 in damages at t2 if 
it does occur.  Firm also needs to repay Creditor 2 at t2, and it will go bankrupt if the 
total amount of debt obligations exceeds its asset value.  Assume that issuing a 
secured debt is costless, and that creditor monitoring is impossible. 
When Creditor 2’s loan is secured and Firm takes precaution, only $500 will be 
left to repay the loan in case of investment failure.  So Creditor 2 will charge $1,500 
as the interest of the loan.133  Accordingly, Firm will undertake Project 2 and its net 
private gain will be 25%(7,200 + 500 – 1,000 – 1,500) – 1,000 = $300.  But if Firm 
does not incur any cost to take precaution, it will have $1,000 to pay back the secured 
loan advanced by Creditor 2 since the existence of Creditor 1 does not alter the 
priority status held by the secured lender.   Hence, the loan becomes riskless and its 
interest drops to zero.  Then, we will expect Firm to invest in Project 1 and obtain a 
                                                        
133 Solve 25%(r + 1,000) + 75%*500 = 1,000, where r is the amount of interest.  Note Firm will play 
opportunistically to invest in Project 2 if the interest is set at $500, the solution to 50%(r + 1,000) + 
50%*500 = 1,000. 
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net gain of 50%(4,000 + 1,000 – 1,000) – 50%*50%*1,500 – 1,000 = $625.134  
Obviously, Firm prefers to invest in Project 1 and not to take precaution when a 
secured debt is used.  Therefore, the social gain from this option is 4,000*50% – 
1,000 – 50%*1,500 = $250. 
Conversely, if the loan is not secured, taking precaution will generate the same 
payoff for Firm as when Firm takes precaution and the loan is secured, because 
precaution eliminates the probability of harm and Creditor 2 will always be Firm’s 
sole creditor.  But Creditor 1’s claim for damages will arise with 50% chance if Firm 
does not take precaution, and then Creditor 2 will be subject to pro rata distribution 
with Creditor 1 if its loan is unsecured and Firm goes bankrupt.  Aware of this risk, 
the unsecured Creditor 2 would charge Firm an interest equal to $900 should it not 
take precaution.135  As a result, secured lending not allowed, Firm will choose not to 
take precaution and invest in Project 2, earning a net gain of 25%(7,200 + 1,000 – 
1,000 – 900) – 25%*50%*1,500 – 1,000 = $387.5.136  Our society, therefore, gains 
7,200*25% – 1,000 – 50%*1,500 = $50. 
In this example, forbidding secured loans does not encourage more precaution, but 
instead, it leads to higher cost of capital, thus intensifying overinvestment incentives.  
Therefore, the overall social welfare is sacrificed when secured lending is out of the 
choice.  But this inefficiency arises because of the particular investment opportunity 
                                                        
134 In this case, Firm will not pick Project 2 since 25%(7,200 + 1,000 – 1,000) – 25%*50%*1,500 – 
1,000 = $612.5 < $625. 
135 Solve 25%(r + 1,000) + 75%(50%*1,000 + 50%*1,000*2/5) = 1,000, where r is the amount of 
interest.  Note it is not incentive compatible for Firm to invest in Project 1 if the interest is set at $300, 
by solving 50%(r + 1,000) + 50%(50%*1,000 + 50%*1,000*2/5) = 1,000. 
136 Remember that Firm’s net gain, if it takes precaution, is only $300.  
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set available to the borrower.  If the borrower is presented with a different 
opportunity set, unsecured lending may encourage precaution without provoking 
overinvestment, hence improving social welfare as illustrated in the next example. 
Example 7 The upside of Project 2 drops to $6,700, all other conditions being the 
same as Example 6. 
Now, if the loan is secured and precaution is taken, Firm may credibly commit 
itself to Project 1 at the interest level of $500, which will cause Creditor 2 to break 
even.137  Nevertheless, not taking precaution is still a better option insofar as the loan 
is secured.138  In other words, Firm, when using a secured debt, will make the same 
choice as in the previous example – investing in Project 1 and not taking precaution – 
so will be the resulting net social gain, i.e. $250. 
On the other hand, Firm will invest in Project 1 again but choose to take 
precaution if it is barred from issuing secured debts.  Incurring the $500 cost for 
precaution, Firm can expect a net benefit of $500 from its investment in Project 1.139  
But if it does not spend this money, Firm will have to pay the unsecured Creditor 2 an 
interest of $300,140 which drives its net gain down to 50%(4,000 + 1,000 – 1,000 – 
300) – 50%*50%*1,500 – 1,000 = $475.  Therefore, spending on precaution 
becomes a wise choice for Firm, which will send the net social gain up to 50%*4,000 
– 1,000 – 500 = $500.  Apparently, with a decrease in the upside of the riskier 
                                                        
137 25%(6,700 + 500 – 1,000 – 500) – 1,000 = $425 < 50%(4,000 + 500 – 1,000 – 500) – 1,000 = 
$500. 
138 Firm’s net gains, when taking precaution and not doing so, are, respectively, 50%(4,000 + 500 – 
1,000 – 500) – 1,000 = $500 and 50%(4,000 + 1,000 – 1,000) – 50%*50%*1,500 – 1,000 = $625. 
139 See id. 
140 Solve 50%(r + 1,000) + 50%(50%*1,000 + 50%*1,000*2/5) = 1,000. 
63 
 
project, unsecured lending may encourage efficient precaution against tortious harm 
without triggering additional costs of overinvestment. 
There is yet another point regarding the tradeoff between precaution inefficiency 
and overinvestment efficiency of secured debts.  Given a set of investment 
opportunities, the borrower’s incentive to take precaution diminishes as the cost of 
doing so increases.  While commentators often seem to ignore the cost effect on 
decisions to take precaution,141 it may actually force up the interest charge in a 
similar way to the diluting effect of tort claims.  As long as the cost of precaution is 
to be paid out of the borrower’s pocket, it also reduces the borrower’s asset available 
for bankruptcy distribution to its adjusting creditors, the same as what is expected to 
happen upon the emergence of tort creditors when no precaution is taken.  Expecting 
to recover less when the borrower goes bankrupt, adjusting creditors will account for 
the increased risk by raising the interest rate regardless of what actually drives up the 
risk.  From the borrower’s standpoint, therefore, rising expenses can render 
precaution less appealing than staying careless and allowing for tort claims to build up, 
ceteris paribus.142  This point is demonstrated in Example 8. 
 Example 8 The cost of taking precaution rises to $700, all other conditions being 
the same as Example 7. 
Under the secured lending arrangement, taking precaution pushes the loan interest 
                                                        
141 E.g. Bebchuk & Fried, Uneasy Case 2, supra note 5, at 1319; Bebchuk & Fried, Uneasy Case 1, 
supra note 5, at 898-900. 
142 Note that under limited liability regime, the borrower can externalize the costs of torts even when 
the loan is not secured.  Thus, investing in precaution forces the borrower to bear all the costs of 
avoiding the harm, but only enjoy part of the benefits.  Consequently, privately it may not pay for the 
borrower to invest in precaution despite the investment being socially optimal.  
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up to $2,100143 and Firm’s net gain becomes -$25.144  But if no cost is incurred to 
take precaution, Firm’s net gain is again $625.145  Apparently, Firm would prefer the 
latter option, creating a positive social gain of $250, the same as in the previous 
example. 
When unsecured, Creditor 2 will charge an interest of $300 if Firm does not take 
precaution146 and $2,100 if it does.147  Accordingly, Firm’s net private gain will be, 
respectively, $475148 and -$25.149  Clearly, when the cost of taking precaution rises 
to $700, Firm will not be ready to incur this cost even though it is not allowed to issue 
secured debts.  The social gain is still 50%*4,000 – 1,000 – 50%*1,500 = $250.  So, 
in this example, our society should be indifferent whether secured loans are allowed. 
Thus, just like our discussion about monitoring, when we consider the distortion 
effects on precaution decisions, no simple conclusion can be drawn as to the 
desirability of secured lending without the knowledge of the distribution of the 
borrower’s investment opportunities, or the cost involved in reducing the probability 
of accident to an optimal level.150 
 
                                                        
143 Solve 25%(r + 1,000) + 75%*300 = 1,000, where r is the amount of interest.  Note it is not 
incentive compatible for Firm to invest in Project 1 if the interest is set at $700, by solving 50%(r + 
1,000) + 50%*300 = 1,000. 
144 25%(6,700 + 300 – 1,000 – 2,100) – 1,000 = -$25. 
145 50%(4,000 + 1,000 – 1,000) – 50%*50%*1,500 – 1,000 = $625. 
146 See supra note 140. 
147 See supra note 143. 
148 See supra note 140 and accompanying text. 
149 See supra note 144. 




VI. Other Issues 
In the preceding parts of this paper, the focus of discussion centers on the impact 
of secured lending on debtors’ overinvesting incentives.  Below I will briefly discuss 
another two topics appearing in the literature about the efficiency of secured lending, 
and look into whether they will also be bothered likewise by the primary paradox of 
secured lending. 
A. A Note on Underinvestment 
 Underinvestment refers to the situation where, due to pre-existing debt 
obligations, the borrower is willing to forego some efficient investment opportunities 
with positive NPV.  Since it was identified in late 1970s,151 law scholars have 
widely recognized its presence and understood the role of secured lending in its 
solution. 152   In particular, Professors Bebchuk and Fried believe that 
underinvestment is a main efficiency cost if the full priority system is transformed 
into a partial priority one.153 
 With an analysis similar to the one in Part IV B., we may conclude that secured 
debts, coupled with full priority, are able to assuage underinvestment when the 
borrower’s investment opportunity set includes at least one socially efficient project.  
                                                        
151 For the seminal work on underinvestment, see Stewart C. Myers, Determinants of Corporate 
Borrowing, 5 J. FIN. ECON. 147 (1977). 
152 Stulz and Johnson first indicate that secured lending facilitates the solution to the underinvestment 
problem, see Rene M. Stulz & Herb Johnson, An Analysis of Secured Debt, 14 J. FIN. ECON. 501, 
515-17 (1985).  For analysis of this point in the legal literature, see e.g. Triantis, Secured Debt, supra 
note 4, at 238, 248-49. 
153 Bebchuk & Fried, Uneasy Case 1, supra note 5, at 919-20.  Their illustration and description of 
the situation revealed their interest in the underinvestment problem although the term was not explicitly 




First, if both projects are socially efficient, yet the borrower is not interested in either 
for lack of net private gain, a secured debt raises the net earnings from these projects 
as the interest charges, RC1 and RC2, shrink, hence improving the probability that one 
of these projects will be undertaken.  That is to say, secured debts make it easier to 
satisfy either the combination of inequalities (7) and (8) or of (2) and (9).  Second, if 
only Project 1 is efficient, and unsecured borrowing will not lead to a net gain to the 
borrower from investing in either project, secured lending may incentivize it to 
undertake the efficient project by reducing RC1, the interest of the loan.  In other 
words, secured lending elevates the likelihood that inequalities (7) and (8) are jointly 
satisfied.  Of course, in the latter situation, the smaller amount of interest 
accompanied by a secured debt may propel the investment in the inefficient Project 2 
as well when it engenders a concurrent fulfillment of both (2) and (9) as the borrower 
is faced with certain sets of investment opportunities.  Law scholars have long been 
aware of the dual efficiency effects of granting security interests to adjusting 
creditors.154 
 A necessary condition for secured lending to exert its positive influence on 
underinvestment is, again, W-N-RN ≥ p2[x2-C-RC2(0)-N-RN+W].  When W-N-RN < 
p2[x2-C-RC2(0)-N-RN+W] and p1[x1-C-RC1(0)-N-RN+W] ≤ p2[x2-C-RC1(0)-N-RN+W], 
the debtor will invest in Project 2 even if secured borrowing is unavailable.  
Likewise, when W-N-RN < p2[x2-C-RC2(0)-N-RN+W] but p1[x1-C-RC1(0)-N-RN+W] > 
p2[x2-C-RC1(0)-N-RN+W], the debtor will invest in Project 1 even if it can borrow 
                                                        
154 E.g. Triantis, Free-Cash-Flow, supra note 77, at 2162-64. 
67 
 
only on unsecured basis.  This is because given p1[x1-C-RC1(0)-N-RN+W] > 
p2[x2-C-RC1(0)-N-RN+W], p1[x1-C-RC1(0)-N-RN+W] must be greater than 
p2[x2-C-RC2(0)-N-RN+W], 155  so W-N-RN < p1[x1-C-RC1(0)-N-RN+W].  Put 
differently, as long as W-N-RN < p2[x2-C-RC2(0)-N-RN+W], the debtor will always 
invest in some project, rather than staying away from any opportunity.156  Therefore, 
it seems that the merit of secured lending in overcoming underinvestment also occurs 
when, p2x2, the expected value of the riskier investment project is relatively low. 
For the purpose of this paper, of the most importance to note is that the merit of 
secured lending in overcoming underinvestment relies again on the presence of 
nonadjusting creditors.  In other words, this efficient aspect of secured lending finds 
itself subject to the primary paradox, too.  This point is evident from the fact that the 
borrower’s incentive of investment is determined by its entire cost of credit, RCi + RN.  
Secured debts reduce this cost only because we have assumed that RN is fixed.  If, 
instead, the unsecured creditor raises its interest rate after a secured debt is issued to 
other creditors, the overall cost of capital stays unaltered.  Then, secured lending 
cannot be a cure for underinvestment. 
 
B. A Note on Screening Efficiency 
 Professor Buckley asserts that the screening costs of unsecured creditors will be 
                                                        
155 Since RC1(0) < RC2(0), p2[x2-C-RC1(0)-N-RN+W] > p2[x2-C-RC2(0)-N-RN+W]. 
156 Admittedly, when only Project 1 is socially efficient, the debtor may nonetheless opt for Project 2 
and forego the efficient project when W-N-RN < p2[x2-C-RC2(0)-N-RN+W].  But this is considered as a 
problem of overinvestment instead of underinvestment, and secured lending facilitates its solution, as 
discussed in Part IV A.. 
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reduced if security interests are granted to some creditors because “unsecured 
creditors can usually assume that Bu = 0 and need not estimate how many other claims 
will be made on bankruptcy.”157  So, under secured lending, only a smaller number 
of secured creditors have to engage in screening with respect to their bankruptcy 
rights.  This argument, first of all, as Professor Triantis has precisely pointed out, is 
overly simplified since unsecured creditors often do receive partial repayment of their 
claims in bankruptcy.158  It is plausible that, after the issuance of secured debts, 
unsecured creditors tend to screen the borrower more intensively.  They will have to 
bear increased risk when other lenders enjoy a priority in bankruptcy, so every extra 
dollar spent on screening will preserve their stakes by a greater margin.159 
While both Professors Buckley and Triantis seem to believe that, when secured 
debts are issued, the unsecured creditors’ will screen less extensively because “they 
may be able to rely on the screening activity of the collateral given to prior 
lenders”,160 I remain suspicious of the validity of this postulation.  Two factors 
contribute to the fact that unsecured creditors may duplicate the screening efforts of 
secured creditors.  First, the outcomes of screening can be concealed as private 
information so there is no guarantee that secured creditors’ screening will be a public 
good to all creditors.  In other words, unsecured creditors will need to collect 
information by themselves despite the screening efforts of prior secured creditors.  
                                                        
157 Buckley, supra note 5, at 1424. 
158 Triantis, Secured Debt, supra note 4, at 251. 
159 Professor Triantis expressed a similar concern though he may not agree that the adjusting unsecured 
creditors’ overall screening costs would rise accordingly, see id. at 251. 
160 Id. at 251. 
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Second, unsecured creditors are probably unwilling to dispense with the evaluation of 
collaterals when such information is kept private by secured lenders.  Secured 
creditors may hold sufficient cushion of equity so that unsecured creditors might still 
be able to rely on the collaterals for partial repayment of their claims in bankruptcy.  
In addition, if, as Professor Triantis has suggested, unsecured creditors can truly count 
on the screening of collaterals by prior lenders, hence lowering the total screening 
costs, then we should see secured debts issued as early as possible in the debtor’s 
business life, which, unfortunately, finds no empirical support.161  Thus, augmented 
intensity plus comparable extensity implies increased screening costs for the 
unsecured creditors who adjust their screening activities when other lenders are 
secured. 
From the social perspective, what matters is always the entire cost of capital 
rather than the partial cost associated with secured credits.  So, just like any other 
type of capital cost, the overall screening cost will not decline, even if secured 
creditors incur lower screening costs, unless some unsecured creditors do not expand 
their expenditure on screening as a result of secured lending.  If such unsecured 
creditors do exist, very likely, they are the nonadjusting creditors affected by the 
distributional effects of secured debts.  In this sense, even the screening efficiency 
does not seem to be relieved from the primary paradox of secured lending. 
 
VII. Conclusion 
                                                        
161 See Schwartz, Security Interests, supra note 3, at 22.   
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 Is there a less uneasy case for the priority of secured claims in bankruptcy?  The 
answer may be a qualified yes.  On the one hand, since Professors Bebchuk and 
Fried did not identify the advantage of secured lending in moderating overinvestment 
given the presence of nonadjusting creditors,162 the case for the priority of secured 
claims may not be as troubling as they have perceived.  In comparison with 
underinvestment, overinvestment is probably more intractable through renegotiation 
among the parties.163  So dispiriting the latter can be a bigger merit than relieving the 
former.  On the other hand, however, this paper has also shown that even this 
efficiency benefit relies heavily on the distributional effects of secured lending, and 
that secured debts not only tames the overinvesting incentive but can also inspire it 
under a different set of conditions. 
 As elaborated in this paper, the virtue of secured debts in discouraging 
overinvestment under some circumstances should be weighed, first of all, against its 
vice in stimulating overinvestment under others.  Further trade-offs exist between 
this virtue and the dampened monitoring efforts, distorted precaution decisions, as 
                                                        
162 They believe the only desirable investment activity that will be sacrificed after the priority of 
secured claims is restricted to, essentially, the one susceptible to underinvestment.  When the 
borrower undertakes a less risky and more efficient project without issuing secured debts, the 
efficiency gain generated by this activity could definitely be more than the positive externality 
conferred on the nonadjusting creditors.  For instance, in Example 3, the efficiency gain from Project 
1 is 50%*3,000 – 10%*12,000 = $300, whereas the positive externality conferred on the nonadjusting 
Creditor 1 is only (50% – 10%)[500 – 1,000*500/(1,000+500)] = $66.67.  Therefore, such an 
investment project evidently violates condition (2) set by Bubchuk and Fried for a desirable activity 
resulting from full-priority secured claims, see Bebchuk & Fried, Uneasy Case 1, supra note 5, at 920.  
So the benefit of controlling overinvestment explored in this paper is distinct from those efficiency 
gains they have considered. 
163 Renegotiation has long been considered a solution to underinvestment, see Myers, supra note 151, 
at 158; Bebchuk & Fried, Uneasy Case 1, supra note 5, at 920-21. 
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well as costly perfection requirements and complicated bankruptcy dynamics.  In 
view of all these hurdles before an efficient employment of secured financing, any 
extra relief for the uneasy case of the priority of secured credits may appear 
insignificant. 
 The two paradoxes examined in this paper exhibit the complexity of assessing the 
welfare effects of secured lending.  The distribution of borrowers’ investment 
opportunities, lenders’ monitoring abilities, the costs necessary for optimal level of 
precaution, the costs of issuing secured debts, and their ramifications in the 
bankruptcy procedure, among other things, will all wield influence on the overall 
efficiency of secured lending.  Usually, when law makers do not have sufficient 
information about the costs and benefits of certain activities, it is advisable to make 
the person who decides to take action bear all the burdens and enjoy all the rewards of 
his or her decision.  But in the current case, this strategy is not going to work.  The 
quantity of agency costs involved in debt financing varies as the parties that shoulder 
these costs vary.  If the borrower is forced to internalize the entire agency costs, the 
total amount of such costs may become greater than what it otherwise will be if 
nonadjusting creditors share part of such costs.  To say it in another way, 
internalization, though eliminates distribution, may downsize the social welfare pie at 
the same time. 
  Although we are, by and large, still agnostic about the significance of secured 
lending in curing adverse incentives relative to its impact on distributing agency costs, 
a recent study by Professor Listokin has shed important light on the severity of 
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distributional effects in practice.164  Based on a carefully designed empirical strategy, 
he has managed to demonstrate that secured debts are less frequently used by 
industries with large, noninsurable tort liabilities, probably due to the considerable 
costs in bankruptcy.165  This finding, however, is not necessarily good news to 
advocates of security interests with bankruptcy priority.  If his observation is correct, 
then the primary paradox this paper has reviewed would predict that the efficiency 
created by secured lending, should it exist, is fiddling as well.  In that case, the 
controversy about the priority status of secured claims in bankruptcy itself becomes 
normatively unimportant.  Another implication is that the proprietary aspect of 
security interests might be more relevant to their allocative efficiency.  Thus, the 
welfare effects of security interests, when stripped of priority, probably warrant a 
meticulous probe in future.166 
                                                        
164 Listokin, supra note 2. 
165 Id. at 1077. 
166 For instance, one question in need of further exploration is whether a secured creditor’s threat to 
foreclose becomes less credible, see supra note 53.  Relatedly, reconsideration may also be necessary 
about the very idea of separating the property and priority sides of security interests.  It is worth 
noticing that property interests on borrowers’ assets, in general, enjoy a status senior to debt obligations 
in bankruptcy proceedings, see Baird, supra note 27, at 120. 
